

For Reference

NOT TO BE TAKEN FROM THIS ROOM

Ex libris
UNIVERSITATIS
ALBERTAENSIS





THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

RELEASE FORM

NAME OF AUTHOR RAYMOND DOUZIECH

TITLE OF THESIS Guilt as a Moral Sentiment

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED FALL 1981

Permission is hereby granted to THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA LIBRARY to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

Guilt as a Moral Sentiment

by



RAYMOND DOUZIECH

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL 1981

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled Guilt as a Moral Sentiment submitted by RAYMOND DOUZIECH in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

Dedication

To
mom and dad
for the gift of life
and curiosity

Abstract

The purpose of this study was to examine the experience of guilt as a moral sentiment. This objective included the construction of a valid and reliable measure of guilt as a moral sentiment. The phenomenon of guilt was examined and an effort was made to extend the understanding of guilt beyond its being a symptom of illness.

There can, of course, be neurotic guilt, which calls for therapy. True guilt, however, signals that something is morally wrong. Guilt in this light is tied to real decisions, real choices. Such guilt is not symptomatic of disease, but the diagnostic pain of moral health.

Viewed from this perspective, the question was raised regarding the interrelationship of moral sentiment and moral reasoning in moral deliberations. As Sullivan (1977) points out, there exists basic disagreement in moral philosophy between those who place emphasis on the rational and conceptual aspects and those who emphasize emotional aspects.

The epistemology of Bernard Lonergan provided a new insight into the discussion. Lonergan and his followers (Conn, Doran) have argued for a balance between cognition and feeling in moral judgments -- "deliberation...unifies knowing and feeling" (Lonergan, 1974, p. 277).

Researching the relationship of a moral sentiment such as guilt and moral reasoning became the secondary objective of this study. Prior to this, however, in order to

adequately study guilt as moral emotion, it was deemed necessary to construct a valid and reliable measure of guilt. A MOral SEntiment Scale (MOSES) was constructed and validated using the model of test development suggested by Loevinger (1957). After initial factor analysis, 35 guilt-provoking stimuli were selected as items for the inventory. This initial analysis was carried out after administration of the MOSES to 236 adult volunteers -- 95 theology students and 141 engaged men and women. The results of this testing were factor-analyzed using the Principal Factor method rotated to a Varimax criterion. Five factors were extracted and meaningfully interpreted. These factors were:

1. Non-intentional situational guilt
2. Morally culpable guilt
3. Existential guilt
4. Intra-personal guilt
5. Inter-personal guilt.

Internal consistency of the MOSES was estimated. The overall alpha coefficient was .904.

Criterion-related validity testing was achieved by administering the MOSES along with the Mosher Forced-Choice Guilt Scale to a group of 45 adult volunteers. Inter-scale correlations were high and significant ($p < .01$) between Factor II and the Mosher test. An overall canonical correlation was also significant ($p < .01$).

The relationship of guilt and moral reasoning was then carried out using the MOSES and Rest's (1979b) test of moral reasoning. Two groups were used -- 55 professional engineers and 66 students studying ethics -- for this phase of the research. One significant correlation did emerge between Factor I and Stage 4 moral reasoning ($p < .05$). However, one would have to be cautious regarding the significance of these results since gender of the subjects was found to have a modifying effect.

The results of the research indicate the following conclusions:

1. The MOSES is a valid and reliable measure of guilt as moral sentiment.
2. True guilt is a multi-dimensional experience.
3. Differences in the experience of guilt vary from one group to another.
4. Females and males have significantly different experiences of guilt over intentional moral failure.
5. The relationship of guilt and moral reasoning is tenuous. Some relationship was found between unintentional moral failure and Rest's Stage 4 moral reasoning.

Acknowledgements

"I thank my God each time I think of you, and when I pray for you, I pray with joy." *Eph. 1,16-17*

I want to acknowledge the invaluable help and encouragement given to me by so many. Special thanks goes to Dr. William Hague, chairman of the supervisory committee, for his advice and support throughout the doctoral program and subsequent dissertation.

Gratitude is also expressed to the other members of the supervisory committee, Dr. Peter Calder, Dr. Robert Fischer, Dr. Donald Massey, Dr. Vern Nyberg, and Dr. Tom Francoeur, the external examiner. Their suggestions, advice, and individual guidance contributed greatly to this study.

A special acknowledgement and thanks goes to Dr. Lowell Williams, Career Development, Association of Professional Engineers, Geologists, and Geophysicists, for his gracious cooperation.

In conclusion, I want to thank my family, and the many friends who have provided help, support, encouragement, and understanding along the way.

Table of Contents

Chapter	Page
Chapter I	
Guilt as Moral Sentiment	
.....	1
A.	
The Problem	2
B.	
Three approaches to guilt	4
The individual as guiltless	4
The individual as guilty	7
Guilt as human phenomenon	10
C.	
The meaning of guilt	22
Neurotic guilt and true guilt	22
Guilt by omission and commission	25
An operational definition	26
D.	
Research on guilt	31
E.	
Summary	33
Chapter II	
Guilt and Moral Consciousness	
.....	35
A.	
Moral reasoning	36
The moral socialization approach	36

The cognitive-developmental approach	37
Critique of cognitive-developmental approach	38
B.	
Affect and moral reasoning	41
Piaget and Kohlberg	41
Extending Piaget and Kohlberg	47
C.	
Guilt and moral reasoning	57
Emotion and moral reasoning	58
Opinion about the role of guilt	59
Research in guilt and moral reasoning	60
D.	
Conclusion	61
E.	
Research Questions	62
Chapter III	
The Moral Sentiment Scale	
.....	64
A.	
The Substantive Component	65
Procedure: Item selection	67
B.	
The Structural Component	71
C.	
The External Component	72
Construct validity: Mosher & MOSES	72
Guilt and moral reasoning	74

Sample	76
Data Analysis	78
D. Summary	80

Chapter IV Results

.....	81
A. Substantive and structural components	81
Factor Analysis of the MOSES (MOral SEntiment Scale)	81
Further analysis: Reliability/Generalizability	96
Further analysis: Factor Scores	96
B. The External Component	98
Analysis of Results: Pearson correlations	98
Analysis of results: Canonical Correlation	104
C. The relationship between guilt and moral reasoning	106
Analysis of results: Canonical correlation	112
D. Summary	119

Chapter V Discussion and Implications

.....	121
A. Summary	121
B.	

Findings and Discussion	124
Question 1	124
Question 2	127
Question 3	128
Question 4	130
Question 5	131
Question 6	135
Question 7	137
C. Implications	139
D. Further research	142
Bibliography	145
Appendix 1 . The Moral Sentiment Scale - version 1	155
Appendix 2 . The Moral Sentiment Scale - version 2	158
Appendix 3 . Defining Issues Test	161
Appendix 4 . Cover letter - APEGGA	169
Appendix 5 . Cover letter - Douziech	170
Appendix 6 . Reminder notice	171
Appendix 7 . Forced-Choice Guilt Scale	172

List of Tables

Table	Page
I.1 Theory of Positive Disintegration	17
I.2 Kinds of guilt	27
III.1 MOSES - version 1	69
III.2 Table continued	70
III.3 Validation sample group	73
III.4 Guilt and Moral reasoning - sample group	77
IV.1 Varimax rotated factor matrix	82
IV.2 Table continued	83
IV.3 Five factors - orthogonal solution	85
IV.4 Table continued	86
IV.5 Varimax rotation - 35 items	87
IV.6 Table continued	88
IV.7 Alpha coefficients	97
IV.8 Analysis of Variance	99
IV.9 Pearson correlations - Mosher and MOSES	100
IV.10 Pearson correlations - Mosher and MOSES - males	101
IV.11 Pearson correlations - Mosher and MOSES - females	102
IV.12 Pearson correlations - Mosher and MOSES	103
IV.13 Canonical correlations	105
IV.14 Hotelling's T^2	108
IV.15 Hotelling's T^2 male sample	109
IV.16 Hotelling's T^2 female sample	110
IV.17 Canonical correlations -MOSES and Rest test	113
IV.18 Pearson correlation - Rest test and	

Table	Page
MOSES	115
IV.19 Pearson correlations - Rest test and MOSES	116
IV.20 Canonical correlation - MOSES and Rest test	117
IV.21 Canonical correlation - Mosher and Rest	118

List of Figures

Figure	Page
IV.1 Scree Test	89
IV.2 Mean scores	111

Chapter I

Guilt as Moral Sentiment

The purpose of this present study was to look at guilt as moral sentiment. In order to achieve this goal the following steps will be taken:

First, a look at guilt. What is guilt? Does guilt have anything to do with moral consciousness? These questions formed the specific objectives of Chapter I and the thesis.

Second, if guilt is a moral sentiment how is it an affective dimension of moral consciousness? What is the relationship of moral affect and cognition in moral choice? These questions are the basis for the philosophical discussions of the second chapter.

The third and fourth chapters bring us to praxis. Is there empirical evidence for the speculation that has gone on? To answer this question necessitates developing a means to measure the moral sentiment of guilt. In developing the instrument a part of a criterion-related

validation will involve a study of the relationship of guilt and moral reasoning.

The final step, in Chapter V, will be a concluding statement on the findings of this study and its implications.

For this study, moral sentiment is defined as that positive or negative feeling dimension occurring within moral consciousness. The term consciousness is from Lonergan's (1972, 1974) usage. It is a generic expression which consists of four interlocking levels: experience, understanding, judgment, and decision. In this thesis moral judgment, moral reasoning, and moral decision making are understood as an integral part of moral consciousness. Moral consciousness is the total process involved in assessing proscriptive or prescriptive moral values and principles.

A. The Problem

Edward Stein has stated that "if there is any way out of man's inhumanity towards man, it will be through an understanding of, and ability to influence favorably his guilt" (1968, p. 6). The importance of understanding guilt is such that Freud said it was the most important issue facing civilization (1930). Mowrer saw guilt as "the central problem" in emotional disturbance (1961). Victor Frankl placed guilt alongside suffering and death as the "tragic triad of human existence" (1967, p. 15). More recently

Narramore (1974b) claimed that guilt was to some degree involved in the etiology of all psychological maladjustments.

While guilt is acknowledged as an important dimension of human experience, this experience has been understood in a variety of ways. Some have referred to guilt as "useless emotion" (Gilligan, 1976). Others hold that guilt is the "guardian of our goodness" (Gaylin, 1979). Is guilt a false, crippling, neurotic experience? Is it a nuisance that we should throw off by our own will power? Or is it part of our reality which must be acknowledged and accepted? Is guilt a dynamic energy, prodding us to be our moral best? Is it a moral sentiment within our moral consciousness?

The answers given to these questions outline some of the divergent viewpoints on the topic. It would seem that guilt can be understood in at least three different ways: It may be seen as an unhealthy symptom; as the ontological condition of the human species; or as a real human experience. Each of these views reflects a different conception of philosophy and psychology. They form a focus for the following discussion.

This first chapter, then, looks at the general notion of guilt from these three points of view. After this overview of the notion of guilt, the next section looks at various meanings of the term guilt to arrive at an operational definition. Finally, a brief outline of research in the area will be sketched.

B. Three approaches to guilt

The individual as guiltless

Some writers seem to see guilt as an experience to be avoided. It is thought that somehow guilt hinders the individual from achieving self-fulfillment. This popular notion is found in Dyer's (1976) best seller Your Erroneous Zones where he states:

"Guilt is the most useless of all erroneous zone behaviors. It is by far the greatest waste of emotional energy. Why? Because, by definition, you are feeling immobilized in the present over something that has already taken place and no amount of guilt can ever change history" (p. 91).

Dyer sees guilt as useless, and in making this assertion he falls in line with a strong tradition of Freudian psychotherapy. In the Freudian concept, guilt feelings represent developmental retardation and serve as useless emotion (Gilligan, 1976).

From the Freudian perspective the individual is guiltless. For Freud, guilt is not the fault of an individual but rather of outside forces -- parents, society, or authorities -- which produce guilt in the person. Guilt feelings do not result from guilt over moral failure but rather result from too strict a socialization process.

According to Freudian theory, moral development is primarily a function of identification and internalization

of society's moral values.

Children learn at an early age what is right and wrong, what brings praise and punishment. The concept of internalization is used to explain how the individual governs his own moral behavior by accepting the standards of the society in which he lives. Freud (1971) describes this phenomenon as:

"...aggressiveness...introjected, internalized; it is in point of fact, sent back to where it came from -- that is, it is directed towards one's own ego.

There it is taken over by a portion of the ego, which sets itself over against the rest of the ego as super-ego, and which now, in the form of 'conscience' is ready to put into action against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other, extraneous individuals" (p. 54)

Hoffman (1970) elaborates on this idea of internalization, when he states:

"The individual does not go through life viewing society's central norms as externally and coercively imposed pressures to which he must submit. Though the norms are initially alien, they are eventually adopted by the individual, largely through the efforts of his

early socializers -- the parents -- and come to serve as internalized guides so that he behaves in accord with them even when external authority is not present to enforce them. That is, control by others is replaced by self-control" (p. 262).

Through identification and internalization a sense of "ought" becomes a continuant in our human experience (McKenzie, 1962). It is from this sense of ought (superego) that guilt originates.

"We know of two origins of the sense of guilt, one arising from a fear of authority, and the other, later on, arising from the fear of the superego" (Freud, 1971, p. 57).

This socialization process is responsible for an individual's guilt feelings. Through internalization the individual represses the desires he possesses. Guilt feelings do not arise from actions committed but from imposed expectations. This position makes society the antagonist to the person's desires, and the individual is a victim. The blame is on society or its structures. At fault are parents, governments, big corporations, even entire cultures, while the individual remains exempt. Adhering to the Freudian position, private guilt is evaded, and seen as a debilitating feeling with no basis in the person's own history.

With tongue-in-cheek the outcome may be summarized in the "Psychiatric Folksong":

At three I had a feeling of
 Ambivalence toward my brothers
 And so it follows naturally
 I poisoned all my lovers.
 But now I'm happy; I have learned
 The lesson this has taught
 That everything I do that's wrong
 Is someone else's fault.

(quoted in Mowrer, 1961, p. 49)

The individual as guilty

Another point of view comes from existentialism. For the existentialist, guilt is a defining dimension of human existence. Kierkegaard would describe guilt as the core of human experience (Carr, 1973). Man is guilty at the core of his being. We are guilty not because of culturally induced feelings, as the Freudian position would have it, nor from moral failure, but in a radically ontological sense.

Morano (1973) explains ontological guilt this way: All of humankind is aware of its finitude; although we are finite, we possess the ability to reflect and imagine what it could mean to be infinite. This reflection and imagination create an existential tension between what one is and would like to be. Thus, the origin of guilt is the result of straddling two worlds -- the actual and ideal.

"... man's ontological guilt resides within the irresolvable tension resulting from the discrepancy between what he is and what he would like to be, between what he has been and what he would like to have been, and between what he would like to be and what he will never be able to be" (Morano, 1973, p. 41).

Ontological guilt describes the discrepancies between what a person is and what he would like to be. Objective guilt, on the other hand, describes human deficiencies which relate specifically to moral failings. For the existentialist, objective/moral guilt is but a specific manifestation of an inextricable aspect of one's radically guilty being.

The difficulty with the existentialist position of Heidegger, Boss, *et al.*, is the link between ontological guilt and the moral decisions of day to day living. The connection is alluded to but not always spelled out with sufficient clarity. This relationship is most clearly elaborated by the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber (1965). Buber bridges the gap between ontological guilt as a condition of the human species and guilt as specific content. The concept that bridges the gap is the disruption of relationships between human beings. The disruption of the "I-Thou" bond becomes the root of ontological guilt.

Buber states that the choices we make and the actual injuries we commit have profound significance. These actions

in our human relationships, rather than our personal finitude, are at the core of our guilt. Specific content becomes important in the analysis of guilt.

"Existential guilt occurs when someone injures an order of the human world whose foundations he knows and recognizes as those of his own existence and of all common human existence" (Buber, 1965, p. 127).

What is interesting to note is Buber's shift from guilt as condition of being human (Heidegger, Boss) to guilt as a product -- an injury, a disruption of a relationship. Guilt is no longer the result of an inability to fulfill all of one's potential, but rather a particular failure to respond in a particular situation. Existential guilt is

"guilt that a person has taken on himself as a person in a personal situation"(ibid., p. 126).

Guilt is not the cry of unfulfilled potential but the cry of people who have been hurt by their personal choice. Guilt is tied to real decisions, real choices. In failing to respond to another, the very foundations of human existence have been injured, the relationship between individuals weakened.

Rather than dispensing with guilt as useless emotion, Buber advocates a radical acceptance of one's ontological guilt. Acceptance is but the first step; the second is reconciliation.

"Reconciliation means here, first of all, that I approach the man toward whom I am guilty in the light of my self-illumination (in so far as I can still reach him on earth) acknowledge to his face my existential guilt and help him, in so far as possible, to overcome the consequences of my guilty action"(ibid., p. 147).

It is in reconciliation or reparation that an individual truly confronts his guilt and establishes a new relationship to the world and with one's fellow. The goal of therapy is towards restitution through acceptance. The experience of guilt, for Buber, can open the door to a new relationship with one's self and with others. Guilt and reconciliation form the dialogue of life. Guilt becomes a dynamic energy, challenging us to completeness.

Guilt as human phenomenon

Thus far we have seen how guilt is referred to by Freudian psychology as symptom of disease and by the existentialists as a condition of our being human. We have also seen how Buber describes this condition of being human in terms of the disharmony that exists in our interrelationships. In this way, Buber provides both a philosophical and psychological basis for ontological guilt as a result of the activity of the person. Perhaps another way of expressing this might be to say that guilt does not define the being of the human person so much as our actions

define us as being guilty. As such guilt is a human phenomenon resulting from "real unnecessary harm" done to self, others, and/or their environment (Maguire, 1978).

Guilt as positive emotion

Guilt as we have seen, can be a stagnant, debilitating awareness. Many critiques of the Freudian position claim that guilt can also be seen as a positive aspect in the development of the human person. Among the advocates of this latter position are Mowrer (1961), Lifton (1979), Gaylin (1979), and Hoffman (1975).

Mowrer, (1961) strongly condemns Freudian theory for trying to eliminate guilt feelings by reducing the effects of the superego. Mowrer thinks that psychoanalysis has failed to appreciate the role of true guilt, sin and moral responsibility. He states:

"Anxiety comes not from acts the individual would commit but dare not, but from acts which he has committed but wishes he had not"
(Mowrer, 1950, p. 537).

McKenzie also states that the central weakness of Freudian moral psychology lies in its failure to adequately deal with the nature of moral obligation. The basis for conformity to moral standards is fear of punishment, anxiety

over losing love, fear of our own aggressive impulses.

"Nothing is said of the possibility in advanced levels of moral development of self-imposed rules, or respect for principles of conduct rationally accepted as binding" (1962, p. 43).

Robert Lifton (1979) claims that Freud dealt mostly with pathological susceptibility to guilt which he calls "static guilt". The term emphasizes the deadening quality of this form of guilt, the prolonged self-condemnation which immobilizes an individual. Lifton (1979) also states that Freud had no provision for guilt as a transforming energy. This he calls "animating" guilt. Animating guilt transforms self-condemnation into change and renewal. This is the guilt of the war veteran whose guilt energy is transformed into action against the war and the pursuit of moral change.

This positive animating aspect of guilt is echoed by Gaylin (1979) who sees guilt as a vital emotion, a special kind of anxiety acting as the "guardian of goodness". It is his opinion that guilt shapes much of our goodness and generosity. A similar view is advocated by Menninger (1973), who sees acknowledgement of guilt and sin as a

sign of health while denial is destructive to personal and social well-being. Narramore (1974a) also sees the denial of guilt as non-therapeutic and a distortion of a true subjective experience.

In summary, guilt may be a positive emotion, a sign of health rather than the symptom of disease. Some research has been done on the motivating dynamics of guilt. Freedman (1970), Rawlings (1970), and Regan (1971) found that guilt motivated expiation, and transgression led to greater compliance. Typically, the subjects in an experiment were made to feel guilty, for example, ruining an experiment because of their own negligence. As expected, subjects who felt guilty were more generous than control subjects in volunteering for future experiments or contributing to charity .

Guilt as developmental

As noted above, several authors (Gaylin, Hoffman, Lifton, Mowrer, and McKenzie) have criticized the traditional Freudian position on guilt as being too narrow and restrictive. They claim, with reason, that guilt can be a stagnant, neurotic experience; however, they point out that true guilt can be a positive aspect in the moral life of an individual. In other words, guilt can be positive moral affect.

Guilt can be a positive moral emotion, and has been understood as part of the emotional and moral growth of the individual. This view of the developmental nature of guilt has been presented by at least three different authors: Hoffman (1965); Rest (1968); and more elaborately by Dabrowski (1977) and his associates Piechowski (1975), and Ogburn (1976).

Hoffman (1975, 1976, 1977) alludes to a developmental growth process in one's experience of guilt. This has also been elaborated by James Rest (1968). Rest, using a cognitive approach to moral development based on Kohlberg and Piaget, presents six stages of moral sentiment as it affects moral judgment. At stage-one, conscience is governed by the irrational fear of punishment. In stage-two, action is motivated by self-interest, guilt feelings are ignored and punishment-consequences are looked at pragmatically. Stage-three action becomes motivated by approval or disapproval of others. Guilt at this stage is anticipatory anxiety resulting from disapproval of others, either real or imagined. At a stage-four level of moral development action is motivated by the anticipation of dishonour, and guilt flows from concrete harm done to others. Stage-five actions

reflect a concern about maintaining self-respect and respect of equals and of the community. And at stage-six, concern shifts towards maintaining one's moral principles and the subsequent self-condemnation for violation of these principles.

Another exciting approach has been formulated by Dabrowski and his associates (Piechowski, 1975; Ogburn, 1976) in his theory of positive disintegration.

Kazimierz Dabrowski

Kazimierz Dabrowski was a Polish psychologist who developed a theory that integrates moral affect and moral choice into a schema of emotional growth. His approach is based on a paradoxical model of death leading to new life. The analogy can be seen in the seed's need to die before it can give life. Unlike Freud with his death-drive, Dabrowski asserts a positive, life-drive -- an inner dynamism and energy that leads one through crisis to new growth.

Dabrowski sees traditional negative (death-dealing) forces such as psychoses, neuroses, and guilt as convertible into positive transforming energies that propel the individual to a renewed and healthier integration.

At the core of the theory is an evolutionary concept of growth. Development is seen as a change in structure -- from a lower form to a higher, more complex form. This developmental change is called "positive disintegration".

"Positive disintegration is the name for the process by which the structure of a higher level replaces the structure of a lower one" (Piechowski, 1975, p. 239).

The theory proposes four different structures: primary, unilevel, multilevel, and secondary. These structures result in five levels: (I) primary integration, (II) unilevel disintegration, (III) spontaneous multilevel disintegration, (IV) organized multilevel disintegration, and (V) secondary integration. Table 1 gives a description of these five levels.

This multilevel approach to emotional development is central to the theory. The levels form a hierarchy from the first to the last. Enclosed between two levels of integration are three levels of disintegration. It is in these levels of disintegration that a dissolution of mental structures occurs. This disintegration is necessary before higher level integration can occur.

TABLE 1

Theory of Positive Disintegration

LEVEL AND NAME	DESCRIPTION
Level I: Primary integration	At this level the individual is characterized by an absence of emotional involvement with others, the absence of reflection and internal conflicts. This is a level existing prior to developmental change. Behavior is directed towards fulfilling basic hedonistic needs such as power and recognition.
Level II: Unilevel Disintegration	In Level II the individual leaves the rigidity of the first level and begins to question, doubt, hesitate. Relationships are marked by excessive emotion. Inner conflicts are experienced but resolved without much inner struggle. Behavior conforms to expectations and lacks autonomous decisions.
Level III: Spontaneous Multilevel Disintegration	At this level internal conflicts are numerous. Moral conflicts, self-evaluation, reflection is typical. There is an increased awareness of "what ought to be" against "what is." Relationships become more selective. Behavior becomes more autonomous and guided by chosen values and principles.
Level IV: Organized Multilevel Disintegration	"The distinguishing feature of level IV is conscious formation and synthesis" (Piechowski, 1975, p. 262). Values are more clearly defined at this level. Tensions and inner conflicts have decreased. Behavior is less self-serving and more other directed.
Level V: Secondary Integration	This is the highest level of development marked by inner harmony and the "fullest dynamization of the ideal" (ibid. p. 262). People at this level are totally "congruent" and their behavior is marked by universal compassion and self-sacrifice.

Guilt as multilevel

Guilt is considered a multilevel dynamism (Ogburn, 1976). That is, guilt is a dynamic experience which serves to promote developmental change from one level to another. The theory suggests that guilt is present in Levels II, III, and IV, but is most acutely experienced in Level III. Ogburn does not see guilt as a function of Levels I or V. Level I is excluded because of the lack of inner reflection and Level V because of the absence of inner conflict. It is at Level III that guilt is most powerfully experienced and functions most forcefully to promote development.

Each level of structural organization shapes the experience of guilt. Guilt will be different for an individual who functions primarily at Level II than for an individual who functions in the Level III mode. The content of the experience might be similar, but the manner in which the individual experiences the feeling will be different. The experience of guilt over behaving wrongly may have factors in common for individuals at different levels, but the form and quality of the experience will be shaped by the structure of the levels in which they function. One could visualize each level as a different mold for clay. The clay -- in this case guilt -- is poured into

the mold; the mold shapes the clay and gives it form and quality. So too the structure of each level molds the common substance (guilt) into a unique experience or dynamism.

Piechowski (1977) also describes the various experiences of guilt at each level of development. In Level I there is an absence of guilt. The individual is totally self-centered and is motivated by external considerations -- getting caught, being noticed. At Level II insight is still weak and guilt feelings are passive. For Dabrowski an individual at Level II lacks moral responsibility and guilt comes from a lack of acceptance, lack of approval. As such, guilt in this level is debilitating and lacks the power to move one to higher levels. At level III moral concerns and moral responsibility come to the foreground. Dabrowski (1977) describes guilt at this level as discomfort over moral failures. Guilt arises out of interpersonal relationships. These feelings precede a sense of moral responsibility.

"Guilt produces the experience of heightened sensitivity to one's primitiveness, carelessness, and inconsiderateness in relation to partner or family. Guilt generates a

sense of responsibility. Guilt, here, acquires the deeper meaning of feeling responsible for failure in loyalty toward one's ideal, for betraying one's ideal" (Dabrowski, 1977, p. 80).

Level IV is an elaboration of Level III. In Level III there is a split between "what is" and "what ought to be". In Level IV this becomes "what ought to be, will be". Moral anxieties are oriented towards others. One is able to identify with others. At this level the individual consciously develops his own autonomous hierarchy of values.

In Level V responsibility, love for others and the need to turn this love into action are the chief characteristics. Personality ideals are self-chosen, self-affirmed, and characterized by self-awareness. A personal synthesis is achieved.

In summary, Dabrowski's theory of positive disintegration is essentially a theory of emotional development (Piechowski, 1975). Present theories of development, in his opinion, focus too much attention on physical changes, observable differences, cognitive changes. They focus too little on emotional growth. Ogburn (1976) in referring to Dabrowski, maintains that the

ultimate direction and control of behavior are emotional rather than intellectual.

Dabrowski's theory revolves around a multilevel developmental pattern. At the core of this multilevelness is a consciousness of value based on an awareness of "what is" and "what ought to be". The function of guilt, in this framework, is to provide dynamic energy to move one to bridge the gap between one's ideals and one's view of inner reality. This demands the adoption of a new hierarchy of values that is consistent with one's personality ideal.

Thus far we have seen three basic notions of understanding guilt. Some have seen guilt as an unhealthy symptom, others have regarded it as a defining aspect of human existence, and a third group has looked upon it as a positive developmental phenomenon. In this last way of understanding guilt, it was pointed out that guilt could be a positive moral emotion. As an emotion, it was further shown to be part of the emotional growth of the person. This was particularly the position of Dabrowski (1977) and his associates.

Having determined a basis for looking at guilt as a positive moral affect, the next step is to look at the operational meaning of the term guilt as used in this study.

C. The meaning of guilt

What is meant by guilt? Thus far our discussion has led us to use the word "guilt" in a variety of contexts. It seems important at this time to look at what we mean by this term. If Mowrer (1961) is correct, there is a popular tendency in psychology to characterize all guilt as neurotic. This assumption has led to confusion and tension among the psychologist, philosopher, theologian, moralist, and those of the legal professions. For, if all guilt is neurotic, then its presence must be symptomatic of disease. This moves guilt away from culpability and responsibility and into the arena of therapeutic intervention.

At the heart of the operational definition of guilt, however, is a distinction between neurotic and true guilt. It is important, therefore, at the outset of this section to distinguish clearly the difference between these two types.

Neurotic guilt and true guilt

Guilt, both true and neurotic, flows from a subjective experience of regret, shame, or remorse over the violation of an ideal, an image of the kind of person I expect myself to be. As Narramore (1974a) states:

"Within each of us is a set of goals, standards and aspirations, the ideal self. When our performance falls short of these ideals a corrective response is triggered. This corrective response comes either from our threatening, punitive self or from our

rational, loving disciplinary self."

Violation of these ideals results in moral anxiety (guilt). According to Narramore, insofar as the punitive self is operative we experience neurotic guilt; insofar as the disciplinary self is operative we experience true guilt.

True guilt follows transgression and results in self-disappointment. Neurotic guilt follows real or imagined transgression and centres on fear of external consequences. As Gaylin (1979) states, true guilt is a sense of anguish that comes from not achieving the standards of what ought to be. In similar terms, Stein (1968) defines true guilt as:

"the special form of anxiety experienced by humans-in-society, the warning tension of life principles violated, of conditions of human social existence transgressed, of socio-spiritual reality ignored or affronted, of good alienated, of self being destroyed" (p. 15).

McKenzie (1962), in a more concise turn of phrase, sees true guilt as:

"Some betrayal of what I take to be my duty by which conduct becomes directly morally evil and blameworthy (p. 21).

Another definition of true guilt comes from Maguire, who says guilt results from "conscious and free behavior (active or passive) which does real unnecessary harm to persons and/or their environment" (Maguire, 1978, p. 392).

Psychiatrist Karl Stern (1954) outlines four ways of distinguishing true guilt from neurotic guilt. First of all, in true guilt there is a sense of proportion between the wrongdoing and the degree or intensity of the guilt-feeling. In neurotic guilt, the feelings are unrealistic, something rather minor can result in unbearable feelings. Second, true guilt can be absolved by reparation, the contraventions producing the guilt feelings can be expiated. Neurotic guilt knows no satisfactory punishment that adequately atones for the real or imagined failure. Third, true guilt is not necessarily tied to anxiety, in the sense that an individual can acknowledge failure in calm self-possession, whereas neurotic guilt is always tied into heightened anxiety. Finally, true guilt is related to actual contraventions of moral or social standards. Neurotic guilt, on the other hand, may be related to imaginary infractions and repressed drives as well as acts.

Martin Buber (1965) distinguishes true guilt from neurotic guilt by emphasizing that true guilt always results from an actual violation of a human relationship, a rupture of an I-Thou relationship. Narramore (1974a) also differentiates false, neurotic guilt, and true, objective guilt. To the extent that guilt is experienced as self-condemnation, self-inflicted punishment and isolation, it is seen by Narramore as false, neurotic, pseudo guilt. Objective guilt results in a positive, self-corrective attitude; we recognize our failures but continue to respect

ourselves and maturely plan ways of improving our behavior.

Mowrer (1961) believes that an individual feels guilty because he is guilty. He has committed a transgression, done something wrong, or offended a significant other. Thus for Mowrer, the term "neurotic guilt" is misleading, if one believes neurotic guilt to be unwarranted. He states that behind all neurotic guilt feelings are real offences, true guilt. Any other cause, in his view, would not become a serious problem for the individual.

Guilt by omission and commission

Guilt can be divided into neurotic and true. As Mowrer points out, neurotic guilt is not unwarranted feeling but rather feeling that is disproportionate to reality. True guilt, on the other hand, is the result of moral irresponsibility, and moral failure. Respecting true guilt, a further distinction may be made between guilt by commission and guilt by omission. Often guilt arises from what has been left undone rather than by what one has done. Hoffman (1976) draws out this distinction.

Hoffman (1975, 1976, 1977) defines guilt in interpersonal and developmental terms. He (1976) characterizes guilt as one's awareness of being the cause of another's distress. Although little is known about the development of the guilt response, Hoffman (1976) speculates that guilt over inaction is likely to be more advanced developmentally than guilt over actual commission, "since the former requires the capacity to visualize something that

might have been done but was not" (p. 140).

The ability to experience guilt even when one has done no wrong is the basis for what Hoffman (1975, 1976) calls "existential guilt". The reaction of existential guilt occurs when the person feels responsible because of circumstances of life beyond one's control. For example, the awareness of some of the relative advantages and opportunities we have in the developed world and the conditions of the less fortunate. Existential guilt may prompt individuals to do something to alleviate the conditions of the disadvantaged.

"Existential guilt may require continued activity in the service of alleviating human suffering rather than merely a discrete act of restitution in order to afford one a continuing sense of self-worth" (Hoffman, 1976, p. 141).

Table 2 summarizes the various kinds of guilt. As outlined, true guilt (both by omission and commission) flows from a violation of one's self-imposed rules, one's own principles of conduct. The present study, on the experience of guilt, is a study of true, objective guilt resulting from specific moral failures.

An operational definition

The movement of this chapter has been, first of all, to establish a case for guilt as a real human phenomenon, a moral affect resulting from the infractions of moral

TABLE 2

KINDS OF GUILT

KINDS OF GUILT

ONTOLOGICAL

Guilt as a defining dimension of human existence. Man is ontologically incomplete, and lives in a tension between what he is and would like to be. This tension is the burden of guilt

OBJECTIVE/LEGAL

A specified or implied offense. A punishable contravention of law determines objective-legal guilt.

GUILT

Neurotic

false guilt
pseudo guilt
functional guilt

a distorted experience of guilt over real or imagined moral failures, the result of social constraint or fear or punishment, a fear of losing the love of others, a fear of one's aggression towards others

SUBJECTIVE

True/Real

constructive
guilt
value guilt

a sense of wrong-doing arising out of real unnecessary failure towards moral or social contraventions, or one's own principles of conduct

existential
guilt
(Hoffman,
1975, 1976)

An awareness of the disparities that exist in the world, and feeling in some way responsible especially by passive inaction.

collective
guilt

A failure through omission to take appropriate action when political authorities violate the rights of individuals

principles. As noted above, a distinction was made between real/true guilt and neurotic guilt. Neurotic guilt was seen as a feeling disproportionate to failure which could be real or imagined. In contrast, true guilt was the result of real moral failure through active or passive behaviour. The operational definition for this study flows from these considerations.

The operational definition for this study is that *guilt is a moral sentiment arising from conscious and free behaviour (active or passive) which does real unnecessary injury to self, others, and/or their environment*. Let us look at the details of this definition. First of all, guilt is moral sentiment. In stating that guilt is a moral sentiment, we are acknowledging that guilt is moral affect, moral emotion. As such, guilt is a feeling arising from failure of a moral nature. Since we are referring to a moral context, true guilt -- as opposed to neurotic, false guilt -- is seen as moral irresponsibility rather than a symptom of disease. It is true that the individual without conscience can feel too little guilt or none at all, while the scrupulous individual may feel a disproportionate amount. In fact sometimes we have no feeling of guilt when we are legally guilty of transgression. However, the present definition delineates the perimeters for this study as centered on subjective guilt feelings arising from specific failures for which an individual considers oneself blameworthy. Guilt is the violation of a sense of ought, an

affective dimension of moral consciousness.

In referring to conscious and free behaviour, there is an awareness of how limited our freedom really is. In many ways we are determined by our culture, upbringing, environment, etc. However, as Maguire (1978) points out, our behaviour must to some extent be conscious and free if it is to merit moral evaluation.

Our behaviour as Maguire (1978) and Hoffman (1975) have mentioned can be active or passive. Our guilt can arise from actions we commit or from inaction. Inaction does not mean nonbeing, but rather choosing not to become involved, not to act in a responsible way.

A third element in our definition of guilt is behaviour which does real unnecessary injury. The key word here is injury. Contrary to Maguire's (1978) use of "real unnecessary harm", real unnecessary injury allows for a broader scope of stimuli which can cause guilt feelings. Harm focuses on guilty action that causes physical or mental damage to another; injury allows for the inclusion of any action which may hurt another or be considered an injustice. For example, many actions for which we feel guilt may be against convention, social etiquette, or social taboos. While infractions of these conventions may not cause real harm to another they may be perceived as an undesirable disruption in one's relationships with another -- an injury in the broadest sense of the word.

The word unnecessary is used to qualify the injuries which cause guilt feelings. Some injuries may be judged as necessary -- for example, the case of Heinz in Kohlberg's dilemmas stealing drugs to save the life of his wife. Injury to another's property in this case is judged as necessary to prevent injury to another's life. In this situation Heinz would probably feel no guilt for his act. However, inaction and subsequent injury to life would probably cause a great deal of remorse.

The final element is that the injury is directed to self, others, and/or their environment. The inclusion of environment may need further explanation. We live in an ecological context which includes humans as well as animals, vegetables, and minerals. For many today, injury to this ecological context is a source of guilt and seen as guilty behaviour. From industry's polluting lakes to individuals' littering city streets, a new sensitivity and consciousness has emerged that calls for one to assume a new sense of responsibility for the world in which we live.

It becomes apparent from the preceding discussion that guilt is more than neurotic, wasted emotion. It is part of our human experience, a real experience of moral sentiment.

A final question in this overview of guilt pertains to research in the area. What kind of research has occurred?

D. Research on guilt

Research in the area of guilt has been varied. Most studies have looked at guilt as it relates to pathological behavior, for example, Ruma and Mosher's 1967 work with delinquents. Ruma and Mosher (1967) studied the relationship between moral judgment and guilt among 30 delinquent adolescent boys. They found that guilt and moral reasoning was significantly correlated ($r=.55$).

Regan (1971), Rawlings (1970), and Freedman (1970) looked at guilt and altruism. They found that subjects who were led to believe they had ruined an experimental procedure volunteered more readily for subsequent experiments.

Mosher (1970) lists several studies that have focused on guilt and sexual behavior. An example of this kind of research is that done by D'Augelli and Cross (1975) on guilt in premarital sexual experience, and Mosher and Abrahamson's (1977) study on sex guilt and masturbation. D'Augelli and Cross (1975) studied premarital sexual experience among 119 undergraduate females and found a significant relationship between guilt and law-and-order morality. Women at Kohlberg's law-and-order stage had significantly less sex-experience and scored higher on sex-guilt than women at higher or lower stages. Mosher and Abrahamson (1977) studied the reactions of 96 male and 102 female undergraduates to films on masturbation. Subjects with high sex-guilt scores experienced more disgust and shame than subjects with lower

scores.

A final group of studies, like Ogburn (1976), have focused on theoretical syntheses.

Few studies, however, have focused on developing a measure of guilt. Three exceptions were found (*viz.* Evans *et al.*, 1974; Mosher, 1961, 1966; and Otterbacher and Munz, 1973). Both the Mosher and Otterbacher inventories focus on a trait measure of guilt -- a personality predisposition towards guilt. Only the Mosher inventory has had extensive validation studies. The Evans' (1974) measure of guilt was developed as an adjunct to systematic desensitization in order to discover what situations produced guilt. In order to reduce guilt reactions, an instrument which would index guilt -producing situations was developed. No follow-up studies were found on the inventory.

One conclusion reached from this cursory overview is that existing measures look to predispositions, and state-traits of guilt which may or may not be founded on true/objective guilt-provoking situations. The absence of measures of guilt as objective moral failure is evident. Following the inspiration of Evans *et al.*, (1974) an empirical measure of guilt was developed. This measure will be more fully discussed in Chapter III and IV. Prior to this, however, the role of guilt in moral consciousness will be more fully discussed.

E. Summary

This first chapter looked at various aspects of guilt. Guilt as a defining characteristic of the human condition and guilt as a crippling experience to be eradicated seemed to represent two diametrically opposed points of view. The moderate stance of guilt as part of the human experience was seen as a tenable, healthy approach to this phenomenon. It was also pointed out how many therapists see guilt as a dynamic, positive force within the make-up of the person, inciting one to moral integrity.

The distinction having been made between true and false neurotic guilt, an operational definition of guilt was given as a moral sentiment arising from conscious and free behaviour (active or passive) which does real unnecessary injury to self, others, and/or the environment. As such guilt was tied to specific failures for which an individual considers oneself blameworthy. Guilt is a moral consciousness, a moral responsibility. In no way does this study attempt to adequately investigate ontological guilt as a condition of human existence, nor does it attempt to analyze neurotic guilt. Rather, the focal point will be the infractions of moral responsibility and culpability as experienced by the individual.

The next chapter will look at guilt in its relationship to moral consciousness. Guilt as moral sentiment is within a context of morality and moral decision making. Specifically, is there a relationship between a moral affect such as guilt

and moral reasoning in moral choice?

Chapter II

Guilt and Moral Consciousness

The first chapter of this study presented an overview of the notion of guilt. The conclusion of this general survey was that guilt could be seen as a moral sentiment. As such, guilt was placed within a context of morality, a dimension of moral consciousness; moral consciousness being the emotional, cognitive and conative aspects of our moral behaviour.

Placing guilt as moral affect within the context of moral consciousness raises several fundamental philosophical problems. First of all, how does moral affect function within the process of moral deliberation? Is moral deliberation influenced primarily by moral affect? Is moral choice governed solely by cognition? Is there a relationship between affect and reasoning in moral decision making? If so, how does guilt as moral sentiment enter into moral reasoning in moral deliberations?

Several authors have struggled to answer these questions from philosophical reflections and empirical research.

The first section of this chapter looks at moral reasoning in general, and at the theories of Piaget and Kohlberg, in particular. The strong cognitive bias of Piaget's and Kohlberg's theories is criticized from various

points of view, for example, Peters, Rich, Simpson, and Sullivan. A second section discusses the possibility of a balance between affect and moral reasoning by using the contributions of R. S. Peters, and especially the epistemology of Bernard Lonergan. This discussion leads to a concluding discussion on guilt and moral reasoning. The chapter closes with a series of research questions which flow from these deliberations.

A. Moral reasoning

In the attempt to research the area of moral development and moral behaviour, two main approaches have emerged: (1) a moral socialization approach; and (2) a cognitive-developmental approach.

The moral socialization approach

In brief, the moral socialization approach was first proposed by Freud (1930) in his theory of identification and internalization. Freudian theory lays stress on the Oedipal stage around age 4 or 5 when the child develops identification with the parent of the same sex. In so doing, the child internalizes the will of the parent as conscience (superego).

Followers of the moral socialization approach also include the learning oriented theorists such as Eysenck (1976), Goldiamond (1968), and Bandura (Bandura & Walters, 1963; Bandura & McDonald, 1963).

The cognitive-developmental approach

The "cognitive-developmental" approach rejects a "morality reduced to lower forms of psychological adaptation" (Rest, 1979a, p. 40), and focuses on the subject as one who apprehends value and makes moral judgments.

The cognitive-developmental approach has been the focus of the work and theory of Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1963, et al.). By focusing their research on the way people make moral decisions rather than on moral conduct, Piaget and Kohlberg have outlined the way individuals develop morally. In their opinion, why people behave the way they do proves to be a better field of study than what it is that they do. From this premise they have developed theories of moral development that show the various stages of moral reasoning an individual goes through in achieving moral maturity. In brief, Rest describes the cognitive-developmental approach by saying that

"... 'morality' cannot be defined in terms of conformity with the prevailing group norms for it remains a philosophical rather than behavioral concept; a person's morality cannot be assessed without knowing that person's point of view and intentions" (1979a, p. 7).

Critique of cognitive-developmental approach

The cognitive-developmental theories of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg have ignited an explosion of research and writings related to their positions (e.g. reviews in Lickona, 1976; Rest, 1979a; and Staub, 1978). However, this research and these writings have not always reflected unconditional assent. Questions have surrounded both the philosophical and methodological bases of the theory.

Some, like Eisenberg (1976), find that the scope of the theory needs to be enlarged to include pro-social behaviors within a moral judgment framework. Others, like James Rest (1974, 1975, 1979a), have called for a re-evaluation of the "simple stage theory" and the interview method as a means of assessing stage scores. Still others, like Kurtines and Grief (1974) have raised serious questions about the methodology used and the subsequent conclusions reached.

Philosophical criticism has come from various quarters (e.g. Aron, 1980; Gilligan, 1977; Locke, 1979; Munsey, 1980; Rosen, 1980; Sullivan, 1977). Simpson (1976) and Rich (1980) have called for a more holistic approach to morality, one which goes beyond merely cognitive judgments and looks at the existential subject as one who thinks, feels, and acts in moral reasoning.

"More goes into mature moral judgments, in other words, than the necessary logical, cognitive ability of formal operations. And this 'more' points us to the psychosocial

dimension of affectivity, where solid development is just as important for mature moral thinking as is advanced development in the cognitive dimension; for this is in a sense the experiential matrix of our moral judgments." (Conn, 1978, p. 327).

Conn (1981) agrees that Kohlberg's theory has often been criticized as rationalistic (p. 34). Conn (1978, 1981) also stresses that affect and cognition are equally important dimensions in moral decision-making. Turiel (1969), too, has argued that

"An individual's response must be examined in light of how he perceives the moral situation, what the meaning of the situation is to the person responding, and the relation of his choice to that meaning: the cognitive and emotional processes in making moral judgments." (p. 95).

A major criticism has come from R.S. Peters (1973, 1974). Peters faults Piaget and Kohlberg for not probing the motives that explain why a person behaves in this or that manner, for leaving out any assessment of the intensity or level of compassion which influence one's dealings with another. As he says:

"Yet this, surely, is developmentally most important; for what is the moral status of a man who can reason in an abstract way about

rules if he does not care about people who are affected by his breach or observance of them?" (1973, p. 26).

Peters advocates that:

"Love or concern for others has been represented like reason, as being an important aspect of the form of morality which can underpin and transform content connected with roles, rules and the emotional life." (ibid., p. 38).

Elsewhere he goes on to say:

"Strength of character is so often represented in negative terms as saying no to temptation, as standing firm, as being impervious to social pressure.... Rational people are able to do this only if they are passionately devoted to fairness, freedom, and the pursuit of truth and if they have a genuine respect for others and are intensely concerned if they suffer" (Peters, 1974, p. 190).

In summary, then, two theories of moral development have emerged in the psychological study of morality: the moral socialization approach and the cognitive developmental approach. The moral socialization approach stresses

internalization of society's rules and roles to the extent that cognitive processes are absent in moral decision making. The cognitive developmentalists, on the other hand, emphasize reason to the exclusion of any other dimension in moral deliberation. Criticism of this latter view has come from a number of sources. The Piaget-Kohlberg theories of moral development focus rather restrictively on reasoning in the moral life. This feature, however, can be combined with other aspects in a less one-sided account of moral choice. This leads us to a consideration of the relationship of affect and moral reasoning.

B. Affect and moral reasoning

Piaget and Kohlberg

To recapitulate, Piaget and Kohlberg are among the few social scientists involved in moral reasoning who have appreciated the meta-psychological dimension of this phenomenon. Their theory of moral decision making includes an explicit epistemology as well as the findings of empirical research. Their epistemological hypothesis assumes that "moral development has a cognitive core" (Kohlberg, 1980, p. 38). Kohlberg goes on to say:

"This assumption is central to any intellectual approach to moral education and contrasts sharply with irrational-emotive theories of moral-development such as those of Durkheim and Freud" (ibid).

As pointed out above, philosophers (e.g. Alston, 1971; Conn, 1978, 1981; and Peters, 1971) have raised questions regarding this heavily cognitive component. One argument of this thesis is that the cognitive-developmental theory of moral judgment would be enhanced if its paradigm took emotion more seriously rather than focusing on purely cognitive elements in its analysis of moral consciousness.

Ever since the Greeks divided the psychological functions of the person into cognition, emotion and conation, countless attempts have been made to re-integrate them. Cowan (1978) uses the metaphor of Humpty-Dumpty -- and all the philosophers could not put Humpty together again. Piaget and Kohlberg both acknowledge the presence of emotion in moral reasoning but the acknowledgment is cursory and short lived. Both are influenced by the philosophical presuppositions of Kantian formalism (Munsey, 1980, p. 162). For Kant

"feelings are hidden and latent. They are disorder and discordant wellings stemming from the darkness of drives and drive impulses in man's vital sphere in which there either does not happen 'insight' or which are only objects of rational rectification and channelling" (Frings, 1970, p. 109).

In this view emotion or feeling is seen as opposed to reason and the role of reason is to bring emotions "to reason".

In other words, reason dominates the psychological functioning of the person and acts as a gate shutting out emotion or letting them through.

"For Kant, feelings are a chaotic bundle above which moral duty reigns. If emotions are good the gates of reason open; if they are bad, the gates close or purify them in the light of insight and reason" (Frings, *ibid.*, p. 113).

Prior to the Kantian era, Blaise Pascal had insisted on the need to take emotion seriously, Pascal spoke of a "mathematique du coeur", an "ordre du coeur", and a "logique du coeur". After Kant, Max Scheler (1962) took this line of thought and showed how Kant had failed to encompass the person as a whole since feelings and emotions were not adequately accounted for (Frings, 1970).

True to Kantian formalism, Jean Piaget's theory of cognitive development and subsequent theory of moral development seem to place emphasis primarily on the cognitive, rational processes of thought. There seems to be little room for emotions or feelings. In his writings he has said that cognitive and affective development are two dimensions of a single process of human development (Piaget, 1964). And in Play, Dreams, and Imitation in Childhood (1946) Piaget states that symbols always carry both cognitive and affective meanings. Cognitive and affective aspects of any behavior are not two separate systems but represent the "two side of the same coin" (Piaget, 1964).

In a book entitled, Piaget: With Feelings, author Philip Cowan (1978) devotes one short chapter out of 14 to Piaget and emotion. This would seem to indicate that Piaget wrote little on the subject of feeling. In fact Cowan concludes that Piaget's thoughts about emotion appear only as incidental comments in many writings on other topics. What comments are available indicate that Piaget saw cognition and affect as co-equal. Whereas Freud saw affect developing first and the primacy of affect accounting for the tendency to irrationality, Piaget sees cognition and affect as complementary, each supplying a necessary part to psychic functioning. Yet cognition remains the gate-keeper.

Lawrence Kohlberg also holds that cognition and affect are complementary aspects of the same mental event.

"All mental events have both cognitive and affective aspects and ... the development of mental dispositions reflects structural changes recognizable in both cognitive and affective perspectives" (Kohlberg, 1980, p. 40).

Kohlberg goes on to assert that moral judgments often involve emotional components but "the quantitative role of affect is relatively irrelevant for understanding the structure and development of moral judgment" (ibid. p.40). Thus, while acknowledging affect he states that "the primary psychological referent of the term "moral" is a judgment, not a behavior or an affect" (ibid, p. 53).

According to Kohlberg, moral judgment may have an emotional component, but the "development of sentiment, as it enters into moral judgment is however, a development of structures with a heavy cognitive component" (ibid. p. 40).

Thus emotion, in the traditional Kantian sense, becomes opposed to cognition. The role of cognition is to bring emotion under its structural dominance. As Kohlberg concludes:

"In general, then the quality (as opposed to quantity) of affects involved in moral judgment is determined by its cognitive-structural development, a development which is part and parcel with the general development of the child's conceptions of a moral order" (ibid., p. 41).

Kohlberg is grounded in a firm philosophical tradition, that of formalist moral philosophy. For the formalist philosopher morality is best described in purely formal terms, irrespective of its content. A judgment is moral only if it has certain formal characteristics. These formal criteria are principles which are considered supreme. If a judgment is moral it has to be supported by reasons involving these principles. The principles exist prior to society and define the 'right' for anyone in any situation, that is, they are universally applicable. For Kohlberg "the only "true" (stage 6) moral principle is justice" (1980, p. 63).

By developing an "ethical rule theory" (Munsey, 1980), Kohlberg has focused on rules, principles, and reasoning as his foundation for moral development. In so doing, he pushes emotion aside in favor of a dominant cognitive theme.

In summary then, while acknowledging emotion as complementary to cognition, Piaget and Kohlberg fail to develop this relationship or even take emotion as contributing to their theories. In criticism, one could re-phrase Frings (1970) and argue that moral development is not only of the province of rational cognition. It pertains equally to the darkness and silence -- the light and sound of emotion. For the spheres of feeling and emotion cannot be divorced from moral decision.

Conn (1978) cogently summarizes the thrust of this critique when he states:

"The only answer to the problematic of moral judgment (as analyzed by Kohlberg) and the larger dimension of moral life focused on responsible decision and action lies within the realm of the total personality that integrates not only the cognitive maturity of formal operations but also the affective maturity that Erickson finds rooted in the virtues of ego identity" (p. 327).

Extending Piaget and Kohlberg

Bernard Lonergan

It seems obvious that the Kantian formalism which underlies Piaget and Kohlberg implies that judgment is solely or principally rational, non-emotive. This Kantian foundation has been criticized by several authors, e.g. Conn, 1978, 1981; Doran, 1979; and by Lonergan, 1972, 1974.

Bernard Lonergan is a Canadian scholar who, as Meynell (1976) says, is a "contemporary philosopher of the very first rank" and whose writings are among the "most important philosophical (works) to have appeared in the course of the present century" (Meynell, 1976, p. 1).

Lonergan has a wide and varied background. From studies in medieval theology to studies in modern science, he has formulated a new and exciting epistemology. One of the greatest influences in the formulation of his method was the work of Jean Piaget. Although influenced by Piaget's work, Lonergan's study of human understanding is original. It is worth mentioning that he has turned most often to psychology, rather than to philosophy, in formulating his understanding of cognitive processes.

What is of particular import to this discussion is the role feeling plays in his epistemology.

"Just as intelligence sublates sense, just as reasonableness sublates intelligence, so deliberation sublates and thereby unifies knowing and feeling" (Lonergan, 1974, p. 277).

Sublation is described by Conn (1979) in the following words:

"There are successive levels of operation in the process of knowing and deciding related in such a way that the higher level transcends the lower even as it presupposes, complements, and incorporates it (sublation)" (p. 311).

What is important for Lonergan is that the individual in his judgment process incorporates both knowing and feeling. It is the existential, individual, personal subject who apprehends what is good, right, and true. It is the individual subject who judges what is worthwhile. In this judgment there is a "synthesis of feeling and cognition" (Lonergan, 1974, p. 223).

In the process of judging value

"The existential subject, then, not only freely and responsibly makes himself what he is, but also makes himself good or evil and his actions right or wrong.... However it may be that we come to know good Lonergan's concern is with the subject, and with the primacy of the subject as existential, as becoming good or evil" (Doran, 1979, p. 46).

The individual judges what is right and good in feelings. As Doran says: "Values are primordially apprehended in feelings" (1979, iii). This is a paraphrase of Lonergan who also says of the apprehension of value that "such apprehensions are given of feelings" (1972, p. 37).

Value is apprehended in feeling

Lonergan uses the writings of Dietrich von Hildebrand and Max Scheler in his analysis of feelings. For Lonergan there are two kinds of feelings : non-intentional states or trends and intentional responses. Non-intentional feelings are feelings that arise spontaneously from one's disposition and not as the result of reflection -for example, fatigue, irritability, thirst. Intentional feelings, on the other hand, are a

response. These feelings relate us to objects and as such are directional.

"Such feeling gives intentional consciousness its mass, momentum, drive, power. Without these feelings our knowing and deciding would be paper thin. Because of our feelings, our desires and our fears, our hope or despair, our joys and sorrows, our enthusiasm and indignation, our esteem and contempt, our trust and distrust, our love and hatred, our tenderness and wrath, our admiration, veneration, reverence, our dread, horror, terror, we are oriented massively and dynamically in a world mediated by meaning. We have feelings about other persons, we feel for them, we feel with them. We have feelings about our respective situations, about the past, about the future, about evils to be lamented or remedied, about the good that can, might, must be accomplished" (Lonergan, 1972, p. 30-31).

Without feeling, this world mediated by meaning is just the sort of stuff that is in books. Feelings make it alive, and make it terrifically alive" (Lonergan, 1979, p. 116).

Feelings give direction and meaning to value. One of the main functions of feelings, for Lonergan, is the response-factor they bring to values -- aesthetic values, understanding, truth, noble deeds, or virtuous acts. As Doran comments:

" The apprehension of value in feelings initiates the process to these existentially significant judgments of value. The feelings in which potential satisfactions and values are apprehended range everywhere from 'the initial infantile bundle of needs and clamors and gratifications' to 'the deep set joy and solid peace, the power and the vigour, of being in love" (1979, p. 60).

Feelings give meaning and direction to one's apprehension of value, one's initial response-awareness of value. Thus, values are more than abstract moral codes but are grounded in the feeling individual. As Lonergan points out

"Aristotle refused to speak of ethics apart from men that are just, of temperance apart from men that are temperate of the nature of virtue apart from the judgment of the man that possesses practical wisdom" (quoted in Conn, 1978, p. 317).

Conn (1978) elaborates by saying:

"Value is relational; value does not exist in and by itself, value is value for, value for a valuing subject. Therefore, the 'values' of a given situation will be perceived by a particular person according to the concrete shape that the transcendental notion of value, the capacity to raise questions for deliberation has taken in that person, according, one might say, to the present actual development of that person's conscience, according, that is, to his or her character" (ibid).

The process of moral judgment, then, begins through an awareness of value within a response of feeling. "Mediating between judgments of fact and

judgments concerning what is good and worthwhile, is the apprehension of potential values and satisfactions in feelings" (Doran, 1979, p. 97).

The process of moral reasoning begins through an "apprehension of value" within a feeling context. The next movement in the process involves the symbolization of value. As Lonergan (1974) explains:

"The symbol for me is the 'affect-laden image'. It's evoked by an affect, or the image evokes the affect. They're linked. It's the means of internal communication between psyche and mind and heart. Where mind is experience, understanding, judgment; the heart is what's beyond this on the level of feeling and 'is this worthwhile?' -- judgment of value, decision. Without feelings this experience, understanding, judgment, is paper-thin. The whole mass and momentum of living is in feeling" (p. 220 - 221).

The final moment in moral reasoning is a judgment. To move to judgment of value, or specifically to moral judgment, demands more than

feelings but also deliberation. The awareness of value and one's feeling response begins a process of deliberation which leads to judgment. Doran (1979) explains this in the following way:

"The apprehension of value and of potential satisfaction in feelings initiates the process of questions for deliberation which promotes the conscious subject from the rational to the existential level of consciousness, where the individual decides for himself what he is going to make of himself, where he takes a stand reflecting his dynamic orientation to the authenticity of self-transcendence" (p. 59).

In summary then, the movement to moral judgment on this or that deed, this or that action, involves more than mere cognition. There is a larger dimension to responsible decision-making which involves many aspects of the total personality, in particular cognition and emotion. When an individual first becomes aware of a value -- be it deed or act -- this apprehension takes place within the context of feeling. One is moved toward or away from, attracted or repelled, interested or bored. It is within this feeling

tone that judgment occurs.

"The development of knowledge and the development of moral feeling lead to the existential discovery of oneself as a moral being, the realization that one not only chooses between courses of action but also thereby makes oneself an authentic human being or an unauthentic one. With that discovery, there emerges in consciousness the significance of personal value and the meaning of personal responsibility. One's judgments of value are revealed as the door to one's fulfillment or to one's loss" (Lonergan, 1972, p. 38-39).

Thus far an attempt has been made to clarify how we can understand cognition and affect as two dimensions of a single moment in moral decision-making.

In closing, one could easily agree with Conn (1978) when he says that "moral judgment is more than applying logic to moral problems" (p. 327). And one could conclude with June O'Connor (1979) who argues that feeling, as well as reason, has

epistemological value in ethical insight.

"The role of feeling is...most often regarded with suspicion and distrust and consequently is frequently disregarded. Without doubt, there is often a conflict between reason and feeling, between one's head and one's heart, that makes listening to both problematic. Yet there is no doubt that both affect our moral perceptions and both influence our moral behavior, for good and for ill" (O'Connor, 1979, p. 84).

"Both reason and feeling are to be recognized as legitimate sources of truth and are therefore to be given an equal hearing" (Ibid., p. 89).

Our perceptions are never merely abstract logic. What we choose for attention is an indication of our interest or intellectual curiosity. In other words, our cognitive acts are never without some degree of feeling. Whenever we judge something as good, right, or true we do so in the ambience of feeling -- we move toward or away from, exhibit interest or lack thereof. Our judgments of value represent a synthesis of cognition and feeling.

C. Guilt and moral reasoning

As we have seen, psychoanalytic theory assumes that children develop moral standards and behaviors acceptable to their society by learning from the examples of their parents and identifying and internalizing these in their value system. Guilt serves to enforce this identification and internalization. Cognitive developmental theory, on the other hand, views moral reasoning as proceeding through a series of stages in which an individual processes information according to certain rules (cognitive structures) to interpret events and guide one's moral decisions.

Both theories seem to be seriously incomplete. Each one centers almost exclusively on a single aspect of moral reasoning, either affect or cognition. Our excursion into Lonergan's epistemology has demonstrated the sound theoretical basis for rejecting such a bias. In fact as Conn, Doran, O'Connor, *et al.*, point out there is more speculative basis for the inclusion of both affect and cognition in moral consciousness than for a focusing on one or the other aspect. In addressing this issue Hague (1976) points out that

"moral development is development of whole persons -- not just learning or cognitive development or emotional development or identification processes. Moral development covers the whole spectrum of physiological,

instinctive, rational and emotional functioning" (p. 263).

Elizabeth Simpson (1976) also makes an eloquent appeal for a holistic approach to moral development. She explores the possibility of giving deference to the multidimensionality of the human personality. Simpson points out that moral reasoning is the function of the whole person and not simply his capacity to think logically. She claims that "nowhere...has the relationship between emotional development in the moral domain been explored empirically" (p. 161).

Emotion and moral reasoning

There is a deep-seated suspicion among many that emotion is an irrational force which causes us to be less than our moral best. As Hague (1976) points out, emotion has not been sufficiently recognized in moral development because perhaps, "through some holdover idea from the past emotions stand outside of intelligence or even in opposition to it" (p. 236).

Fowler (1978) has also pointed out that both Piaget and Kohlberg see strong emotion as disruptive to reasoning. It interferes with thinking by causing an individual to look at only one aspect of a problem rather than having a detached view of other relevant considerations. Fowler claims that in Kohlberg's view, emotion cannot account for the dynamics of developmental change.

Strong emotion, however, can be a dynamic energy towards moral behavior rather than moral downfall. Recent research has shown that emotion can lead to an increase in prosocial behavior such as helping or sharing (Staub, 1978).

Opinion about the role of guilt

This ambivalence towards the role of emotion in moral behavior is nowhere more marked than in opinion regarding guilt. As pointed out earlier, psychoanalytic tradition sees guilt as a sign of emotional retardation and as a debilitating factor in moral behavior (Gilligan, 1976). Others, such as Hoffman (1976), Gaylin (1979), and Lifton (1979) see guilt as a constructive emotion motivating us to renewed efforts to live up to our values and ideals.

Alston (1971), in a critique of Kohlberg's theory, sees guilt as essential to moral motivation. It is his opinion that the "motive to avoid guilt" plays "a major or even an essential role in the transition from thought to action". He goes on to say:

"Granting all of Kohlberg's contentions, it still may be the case that when one does not act in accordance with one's moral judgment it is because the judgment lacks the extra push that comes from an association between violation of it and guilt feelings" (Ibid., p. 280).

It is Peters' (1973, 1974) opinion that guilt and moral development are indeed related when he concludes:

In moral development a person may first of all behave justly because he is susceptible to rewards and punishment, and then to praise and blame. But he reaches a stage when he sees 'for himself' what makes a rule right or wrong. He sees the wrongness of causing suffering or of exploitation and judges social practices in the light of this first-hand type of appraisal. And, it is argued, the sort of guilt experienced when he does wrong or contemplates it, is qualitatively different from the guilt which is associated with the fear of punishment or of disapproval"(1974, p. 146-147).

Research in guilt and moral reasoning

At least two attempts have been made to research the relationship of guilt to moral reasoning. Ruma and Mosher (1967) studied the relationship between moral judgment and guilt among a group of delinquent boys. They found that the stage of moral reasoning was significantly related to guilt. However, as Kurtines and Grief (1974) point out, all but one of the subjects were at Kohlberg's stage 3 or below. The study provided no rationale for the relationship of guilt to higher stages.

One could speculate that such a relationship between guilt and moral reasoning would not be found at the higher Kohlberg stages simply because of the bias of the measuring

instrument. Mosher's guilt scale focuses on guilt as a predisposition, a proneness to experience feelings of guilt for violating traditional moral standards (Mosher, 1979). This would seem to correspond to Kohlberg's (1976) Level II thinking where moral value resides in performing good or right roles in order to appease the expectancies of others.

This limitation of the Mosher scale seems evident in D'Augelli and Cross's (1975) study of the relationship of guilt and moral judgment to premarital sexual experience. The authors found the high scorers on the Mosher guilt scales were operating at the law-and-order stage (Level II, stage 3). There was less mean guilt for individuals at higher stages and lower stages. This finding suggests that the Mosher guilt scale measures a predisposition to inhibit behavior that violates traditional law-and-order standards of morality. Perhaps other dimensions of guilt, e.g. existential guilt, would relate to higher stages of moral reasoning.

D. Conclusion

In conclusion, Chapter I determined that guilt was that aspect of moral consciousness one could call a moral sentiment. In other words, guilt was seen as a moral affect. The preceding discussion has established a relationship of affect and cognition in moral consciousness. It goes without saying that guilt, as moral affect, is also in some way related to cognition in moral decision making. As McKenzie

(1962) states:

"There is a calm joy in fulfilling the dictates of conscience, and a peculiar sorrow in our failure to fulfill them" (p. 51).

The sense of guilt flows from the violation of what we judge to be right or true. That is the peculiar sorrow in moral failure.

The research cited showed some grounds for an empirical base to the relationship of guilt and moral reasoning in moral deliberation. This research, as well as the previous discussion, expands the horizon for further investigation. The first of these has to do with guilt as moral sentiment itself. Can guilt as moral sentiment be measured? Following this is the secondary question of guilt within the context of moral consciousness, of how guilt and moral reasoning are related.

E. Research Questions

The review of the literature has generated the following research questions:

1. Can a valid and reliable measure of guilt be constructed to reflect guilt as moral sentiment?
2. Is guilt multidimensional?
3. Is guilt experienced differently by people in various walks of life?
4. Are there any sex differences in the experience of guilt?

5. Does a positive relationship exist between guilt and moral reasoning?
6. Is guilt experienced differently by people in the various stages of moral development, i.e., do people in Stage 4 of Kohlberg's scale experience guilt differently from people in Stage 3 reasoning?
7. Does the relationship between guilt and moral reasoning follow a developmental pattern?

Chapter III

The Moral Sentiment Scale

Procedure

It will be recalled that this present work began with an exploration of guilt as moral sentiment. This was followed in Chapter II with a further inquiry into the probable relationship of the moral sentiment of guilt and moral reasoning. This connection was found to have a sound conceptual foundation. Two tasks appear to surface from these deliberations. First, some means of measuring guilt as moral sentiment needs to be developed. Since it was further discovered that little empirical effort has been devoted to an investigation of the relationship of guilt and moral reasoning, this relationship would be a second objective.

The first objective, then, is to discuss the procedures used in developing a measure of guilt as moral sentiment. This unfolds in a three-tier process. Following the suggestion of Jane Loevinger (1957), three aspects are deemed necessary in the construct validity of a psychological test: (1) a substantive component, (2) a structural component, and (3) an external component.

"These three aspects are mutually exclusive, exhaustive of the possible lines of evidence for construct validity, and mandatory" (Loevinger, 1957, p.653-654).

Central to the development of any test are the concepts of validity and reliability. Loevinger (1957) argues that predictive, concurrent, and content validity are essentially *ad hoc* investigations, while construct validity is really the whole of validity from a scientific point of view. Her model of construct validity incorporates these various elements of validity into a three-level process, as well as the aspect of reliability as internal consistency.

She points out that these three aspects of validity closely follow the three stages of the test construction process: (1) selection of test items and analysis of the pool of items, (2) selection of items for a scoring key, and (3) correlation of test scores with criteria and other variables.

The correlation of the guilt scale with other variables will fulfill the second objective of this study, that is, the relationship of guilt to moral reasoning.

A. The Substantive Component

The substantive component, according to Loevinger (1957), includes but goes beyond what was previously called content validity. The area of focus is a selection of items that adequately represents the trait to be measured. The main requirement of Loevinger's model is that test items selected in developing an item pool should be based on more than empirical properties.

"When possible, the items of the pool should be chosen so as to sample all possible contents which might comprise the putative trait according to all known alternative theories of the trait". (Loevinger, 1957, p.659)

Only one measure of guilt was discovered which had strong supportive validity studies, the Mosher Forced Choice Guilt Scale (Abrahamson, *et. al.*, 1977; Fehr & Stamps, 1979; O'Grady & Jonda, 1978; Persons, 1970). Mosher (1979) reviews over 50 studies that provide strong evidence of construct validity. Unfortunately, for the present study, the content is within a psychoanalytic framework and items in the pool are restricted to reflect a view narrower than the one taken in this study.

Mosher (1965, 1966) has concentrated on developing a trait scale of guilt, which yields measures of Sex Guilt, Hostility Guilt, and Morality/ Conscience Guilt. The Mosher Inventory is based on the premise that guilt is a generalized expectancy for self-mediated punishment when one violates internalized standards of moral behavior (*ibid*, 1965). It is within this Freudian framework that Mosher looks to childhood experience and impressions, as well as adult opinions, to formulate the underlying guilt trait. Appendix 7 contains a sample of the Mosher inventory.

While Mosher's scale has considerable merit, it remains an attempt at measuring underlying personality

predisposition traits. These guilt traits are inferred from a variety of questions which reflect the psychoanalytic bias, that is, the questions about childhood and childhood behavior. In this way the focus of the instrument is often removed from present experiences to reflections on the past. From these reflections and present day experiences, an underlying predisposition towards guilt feelings is assumed.

It was speculated that an instrument could be developed which would isolate specific situations which produce the experience of guilt. From these objective moral situations it was further envisaged that the intensity of the guilt experience could be measured. Therefore, rather than measuring a predisposition to guilt, this instrument would measure the actual intensity of guilt one presently experiences.

Procedure: Item selection

In an effort to broaden the scope of the guilt concept, items were selected for the MORal SEntiment Scale (MOSES) from many sources. The MOSES contains items adapted from existing guilt measures, as well as original items suggested by the theoretical speculations of various authors. The principal contribution comes from the Reaction Inventory Guilt Scale (Evans, et al., 1975). Evans and his colleagues tried to identify situations which provoked guilt in a group of 30 college students. Following interviews the authors collated 50 guilt-provoking situations. After administration to 96 subjects a factor analysis of results was carried out.

Four factors accounting for 62.7% of the total variance were identified.

The MOSES uses items which were reported to have a factor loading equal to or greater than .40 (Evans, *et. al.*, 1975). This amounted to 21 of the 50 items. In addition 13 original items were developed which were thought to represent areas of guilt measured by Mosher (1965, 1966), that is, moral conscience/sex guilt (10 items), and hostility guilt (3 items). These items were phrased to reflect situational rather than predispositional guilt reactions. A final set of items had as their source the existential definitions of guilt as expressed by Hoffman (1975, 1976), a total of 6 items; and Buber (1965), a total of 5 items. Table 3 gives a listing of the 45 items and their theoretical sources.

The proportion of items reflecting different theoretical positions is not specified by Loevinger. However, she states that the

"various areas or sub areas of content should be represented in proportion to their life-importance" (Loevinger, 1957, p.659).

This would seem to indicate a certain subjective criterion in a final selection of items to be included in the broad pool of content.

The 45 items were randomly ordered. Each item was on a 5-point rating scale. Subjects were asked to rate the extent of guilt they experienced in each situation. This initial

TABLE 3

Items and their theoretical source

SOURCE	ITEM
Evans, et al. (1975)	<p> Taking too many drugs Drinking too much Finding out you have hurt someone's feelings Not going to church when you know you should. Doing something which you know you should not have done Saying things you don't mean when you are in an argument Not contributing to charities when asked Having sex with someone without being emotionally involved Being stopped by the police for speeding Borrowing money from someone and suddenly realizing you forgot to pay them back. Masturbating Hurting someone's feelings intentionally Changing plans at the last minute which involve someone else. Buying something which you cannot afford. Having sex with someone just for physical satisfaction Finding out you have walked out of a store with something and forgotten to pay for it Failing to reply to a letter from a close friend Cheating Breaking something which you have borrowed Losing something valuable which someone close has given to you. Not doing as well as expected on a project. </p>
Hoffman, (1975,1976)	<p> Having so much while others in the world have so little Surviving or escaping from an accident while someone else is hurt Hearing about tortures by governments on innocent people Seeing pictures of starving children Hearing/reading of bombings, killings, and maimings of innocent victims in war e.g. Vietnam, Cambodia Not taking part in community projects </p>
Buber, (1965)	<p> Getting in an argument with a friend Breaking up with someone who has been close to you Revealing a secret Being mean to someone for no reason at all Being involved in an accident where someone was seriously injured. </p>

TABLE 3 cont'd

Moshier, (1965,1966)	<p data-bbox="370 328 676 356"><u>Moral/Conscience/Sex Guilt</u></p> <p data-bbox="370 375 959 609"> Having evil thoughts Driving away from the scene of an accident Lying to someone to get out of a jam Telling a white lie Being involved in an abortion Cheating on your income taxes. Accepting a bribe Breaking a law because you consider it unjust Having sexual thoughts Walking out of a store without paying for something </p> <p data-bbox="370 628 547 656"><u>Hostility Guilt</u></p> <p data-bbox="370 674 856 748"> Driving recklessly after drinking too much Hitting someone in anger Feeling so angry you would like to kill </p>
-------------------------	--

inventory is presented in Appendix 1.

B. The Structural Component

The structural component of validity, according to Loevinger (1957) refers to the fidelity of the structural model or internal consistency as well as its factor structure. Internal consistency relates to reliability and the factor structure to construct validity.

The initial MOSES inventory of 45 items was administered to two groups expected to have differing experiences of guilt. The first group was made up of 95 students in theology courses at a local theological college, and the second consisted of a group of 141 engaged men and women taking a marriage preparation course in the city of Edmonton. The responses were used to compute a matrix of inter-item correlations. These correlations were further analyzed by the principal factor method (Mulaik, 1972). Orthogonal rotation was carried out using the Varimax method.

When analysis for Engaged and Theology samples was carried out, 11 factors emerged with eigenvalues greater than 1.00. Eventually five factors were extracted from the 45-item correlation matrix and were interpreted. Ten items proved to load on several factors or had loadings less than .40 and were subsequently deleted from the inventory.

The revised 35-item MOSES inventory was then further analyzed. A measure of internal consistency was estimated

and factor scores were obtained for all subjects. A final phase was a one-way analysis of variance between the Theology student sample and the Engaged couple sample to see if, indeed, the two groups differed in their experience of guilt. Appendix 2 contains the revised MOSES inventory.

C. The External Component

Loevinger (1957) in describing the external component of validity says that it includes predictive and concurrent validities, the focus being the relationship of test scores to non-test behavior, factorial patterns or the relationship to other tests. Most investigators refer to this as criterion-related validity.

Construct validity: Mosher & MOSES

To determine criterion-related validity the final draft of the MOSES, and Mosher's Forced-Choice Guilt Scale were administered to a group of 45 adult volunteers studying in a religious education course.

The subjects were 23 female and 22 male adults. Since the sample was drawn from a similar interest group, homogeneity of the group in terms of values and moral standards was anticipated. As well, most of the subjects were from middle class socio-economic and similar educational backgrounds. Table 4 gives the sex and average age of the total sample.

The results of both scales were scored by a microcomputer program developed by the author. Analysis of

TABLE 4
VALIDATION SAMPLE GROUP

SEX	NUMBER	AVERAGE AGE
Male	22	29.1
Female	23	27.3
TOTAL GROUP	45	28.2

results followed the suggestion of Cooley and Lohnes (1962).

Cooley and Lohnes (1962) state that the relationship "between two sets of measurements made on the same subjects can be studied by canonical-correlation methods".

The authors go on to explain that a canonical-correlation "is the maximum correlation between linear functions of ... two sets of variables" (p. 35).

A canonical correlation was, therefore, carried out between the Mosher and MOSES scales to determine the degree of relationship between these two sets of variables (DERS: MULV 04). In addition Pearson correlations were analyzed for the total group and for male and female subjects. Differences between male and female scores were analyzed in order to determine whether hypothesized relationships existed because of sex differences.

Guilt and moral reasoning

To determine whether a relationship exists between guilt and moral reasoning, scores on the MOSES were correlated with those on a test designed to measure the moral factor.

To measure moral reasoning, Rest's Defining Issues Test (1979b) was used. Rest (1974) uses Kohlberg's moral stages as the basis for his test. The test consists of six moral dilemmas and subjects are asked to select from a series of statements the most important issues one ought to consider

in resolving the dilemmas. The way a

"subject judges what are the most important issues over a number of moral dilemmas is taken to be an indication of his appreciation of different conceptual frameworks for analyzing moral dilemmas" (Rest, 1974, p.492).

These conceptual frameworks are equivalent to the Kohlberg six stages of moral reasoning. Appendix 3 contains a sample of the inventory.

Rest (1974, 1979a) points out the methodological problems of Kohlberg's measure of moral development. First of all, the interview process used by Kohlberg and his associates is subject to interviewer and scorer bias; second, scoring is complex and special training is needed; third, test-retest reliability is poor; and finally, the influence of differences in verbal expressiveness may influence scoring. These psychometric difficulties are overcome by Rest's Defining Issues Test. The test is highly structured, making the results comparable from one subject to another; differences due to verbal expressiveness are eliminated; and the objective scoring reduces scorer bias.

The Defining Issues Test has been subjected to more than 100 studies (Rest, 1979a). A review of these studies concludes that internal consistency and test-retest reliabilities are in the high .70s and low .80s for age heterogeneous groups. Cronbach's alpha coefficient (Rest, 1979b) of internal consistency is usually in the high .70s.

Sample

Two sample groups were chosen to represent different segments of the general population. Since the task presented to the respondents required a fair degree of reading comprehension, and results could easily be confounded with intelligence, two groups of apparently comparable mental ability were selected. The two groups chosen were (1) a group of senior students studying ethics, and (2) a group of professional engineers. Since the first group represented individuals in the humanities, and the second individuals in the applied sciences, the disparity of basic viewpoints would be attained while factors of education and ability held somewhat constant. Table 5 gives a breakdown of both groups according to sex, age, and number.

Group one was a group of students in ethics classes offered on campus at the University of Alberta. Over 100 students volunteered to fill out a questionnaire composed of the MOSES and Rest's Defining Issues Test. Sixty-six questionnaires were completed and returned. Respondents were 22 males and 44 females.

Group two was composed of professional engineers in the Province of Alberta. Permission was obtained from the Association of Professional Engineers, Geologists, and Geophysicists (APEGGA) for access to their mailing list to solicit volunteers. From a list of 13,000 members, 100 were selected by random systematic sampling (Ferguson, 1971, p.121-123) for a mail-out.

TABLE 5

GUILT AND MORAL REASONING

SAMPLE GROUP

SEX	MEAN AGE	SAMPLE	NUMBER
Males	Mean Age = 25.1 32.7	Students Engineers	n=22 n=55
Females	Mean Age = 25.3	Students	n=44
TOTAL GROUP	Mean Age = 29.6		n=121

One hundred questionnaires made up of the MOSES and the Defining Issues Test were sent out with a cover letter from the director of Career Development indicating the support of APEGGA plus a cover letter explaining the project. Also included was a stamped self-addressed envelope for return.

Two weeks after mailing a reminder notice was sent to all subjects. Fifty-five questionnaires were completed and returned. Of the respondents only one was female. A copy of the cover letter and the reminder notice can be found in Appendices 4, 5, and 6.

Volunteers in both groups were asked not to disclose their names, to assure anonymity and freedom of response.

Data Analysis

Tests were scored by a microcomputer program developed by the author. Scores were then placed on computer cards. Mean ratings for each moral development stage as outlined by Rest (1979b) and for each of the five factors on the MOSES were computed.

Analysis of the data consisted in establishing (1) significant differences between the groups, and (2) the degree of relationship between the test of moral reasoning and the guilt scale. The traditional levels of significance -- (.05) and (.01)-- were used throughout the study.

A Hotelling's T^2 test was used to determine any significant differences in the two sample groups. As Cooley and Lohnes (1962) point out,

"A situation frequently encountered in research is that of two groups and a number of variables, where the hypothesis concerns the significance of the difference between the two group mean vectors. Hotelling (1931) devised a test for this case called T^2 . Hotelling's T^2 is a generalization of Student's t -test" (p.62).

Hotelling's T^2 (DERS: MULV 08) was, therefore, used to determine whether groups differed on their mean scores on the two inventories. The null hypothesis being

$$H_0: \begin{bmatrix} \mu_1 - \mu_2 \\ \vdots \\ \mu_{p-1} - \mu_p \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ \vdots \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

As quoted above and as Morrison (1976, p.128-136) states, the Hotelling's T^2 is simply the univariate t -test extended to multidimensional variables while taking repeated measurements into account. Following this analysis, correlations among items and a canonical correlation on the basis of mean scores was calculated to determine the degree of relationship between guilt and moral reasoning.

D. Summary

Loevinger's (1957) model of objective test construction was used as the format for procedure. It was noted that an extension of the concept of validity was advocated to include three basic components, that is, substantive validity, structural validity, and external validity. The three aspects were examined in relationship to the construction of the MOral SEntiment Scale (MOSES).

Chapter IV

Results

In this chapter the results of studies are divided into two units related to the three components of validity discussed in Chapter III, that is, the substantive component, the structural component, and the external component. The substantive and structural components are analyzed in section one: the factor analysis study. The external component is investigated in section two: a criterion-related validity study, and the relationship of guilt and moral reasoning.

A. Substantive and structural components

Factor Analysis of the MOSES (MOral SEntiment Scale)

As outlined in the previous chapter a pool of items (45) reflecting various guilt-provoking situations was drawn from various sources. These items were chosen to represent a wide spectrum of theoretical speculation in the area of guilt. The primary rationale was a focus on situations which produce guilt rather than questions which would reflect an underlying personality predisposition (e.g. Mosher, 1965, 1966, 1969).

An exploratory factor analysis was used as the first analysis of data. Table 6 shows the factor pattern of the Varimax rotated factors. Eleven factor were extracted with

TABLE 6
VARIMAX ROTATED FACTORS (45 X 45) MATRIX

ITEM	h^2	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI
1.	.61	.13	.09	.17	-.03	.17	.19	-.06	.68	.03	.15	-.01
2.	.68	.12	.18	.21	.45	.03	-.09	.14	.56	-.22	.03	.00
3.	.63	.15	.12	-.05	.01	.60	.05	.22	.20	-.35	.12	-.03
4.	.64	.03	.02	.00	.29	.30	-.20	.02	.59	.01	.17	.20
5.	.63	.10	.03	.12	.12	.74	.05	.06	.05	.12	.13	.07
6.	.63	.07	-.04	.14	.62	.41	.04	-.08	-.00	.17	.10	-.07
7.	.54	.21	.09	.04	.10	.56	.16	-.03	.20	.24	-.10	-.13
8.	.52	.06	.03	.39	.20	-.04	.05	.11	.24	.24	.41	-.15
9.	.55	.16	.06	.26	.54	.26	.01	.03	.26	.05	.03	.15
10.	.59	.34	.09	.13	.14	.15	.25	-.02	.10	.05	.55	.16
11.	.66	-.07	.35	.04	.07	.03	-.04	.10	.10	.12	.69	.13
12.	.63	.01	.23	.13	.19	.10	.54	.19	.11	.12	.38	.14
13.	.59	.33	.14	-.07	.09	.27	.45	.17	-.03	-.11	.01	.08
14.	.73	.20	.13	.01	-.07	.02	.53	.08	.24	.02	.31	.48
15.	.59	-.04	.15	.25	.06	.28	.19	.42	.13	.10	.17	.39
16.	.53	.02	.33	.11	.03	.06	-.01	.09	.12	.53	.16	.27
17.	.65	.32	.33	.06	.12	.05	.26	-.04	.03	.51	.01	.28
18.	.69	.04	.14	.57	.56	.05	.12	.05	-.01	.01	.14	.03
19.	.62	-.11	-.03	.11	.71	-.06	.14	.14	.13	-.02	.88	.15
20.	.70	.11	.03	.77	.21	.07	-.01	.10	.09	-.02	.12	.14
21.	.70	.18	.08	.11	.22	-.08	.02	.09	-.05	.13	.02	.75
22.	.59	.01	.07	.27	.44	.35	.10	.32	-.14	.06	.04	.26
23.	.75	.09	.81	-.02	-.01	.04	.13	.09	.18	.14	.10	.05

TABLE 6 (CONT'D)
VARIMAX ROTATED FACTORS (45 X 45) MATRIX

ITEM	h^2	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI
24.	.83	.22	.85	.11	.05	.11	.07	.11	.03	.01	.14	.02
25.	.57	.06	.23	.21	.23	.39	.34	.37	-.11	-.01	.04	.07
26.	.67	.64	.04	.14	-.06	.14	.07	.33	.03	.16	.02	.26
27.	.62	-.01	.23	.38	.12	-.14	-.03	.38	.47	.15	-.04	.03
28.	.64	.30	.06	.40	.17	.14	.18	.52	.00	-.10	.02	-.17
29.	.55	.12	.06	.23	.15	.32	.28	.40	.10	-.00	.28	-.18
30.	.63	.42	.06	.05	-.01	.09	.11	.59	.19	.10	.04	.17
31.	.66	.41	.06	-.14	.18	-.19	.44	.13	.38	.19	-.08	.13
32.	.79	.25	.80	-.09	.04	.04	.11	.05	.09	.24	.07	.05
33.	.52	.19	.07	-.05	.06	-.05	.01	.56	.06	.35	.10	.13
34.	.63	.08	.14	-.01	.08	.16	.01	.33	.01	.64	.24	-.03
35.	.56	.14	-.11	.28	.14	.34	.18	.25	-.07	.06	.43	-.14
36.	.70	.05	-.10	.77	.09	.13	.13	.03	.20	.08	.02	.10
37.	.60	.45	.15	.23	.23	.22	.29	.02	-.06	.35	-.06	.11
38.	.63	.61	.06	.11	.21	.06	.34	.20	.11	.11	-.07	.03
39.	.57	.57	.08	-.06	.09	.10	-.06	.12	.11	.13	.41	-.07
40.	.60	.18	.09	-.04	.43	.13	.32	.42	-.03	.14	.24	.03
41.	.60	.00	.16	.09	-.13	.03	.20	.19	.54	.41	.02	-.20
42.	.51	.23	.06	.30	.08	.08	.57	.02	-.01	.11	-.00	-.12
43.	.73	.79	.08	.15	-.02	.09	.20	.13	-.01	.02	.07	-.08
44.	.61	.78	.10	-.01	-.04	-.05	.08	-.02	.01	-.05	.01	.01
45.	.67	.69	.21	.10	-.01	.15	.01	-.02	.10	.04	.08	.17
Percent of Common Variance	100.00	15.22	10.28	9.83	9.64	9.04	8.74	8.70	8.27	7.14	7.06	6.09
Percent of Total Variance	72.54	9.58	6.47	6.19	6.07	5.69	5.50	5.48	5.20	4.50	4.45	3.83

eigenvalues greater than 1.00. These eleven factors accounted for 62.9% of the total variance.

Using Cattell's (Kim & Mueller, 1978) scree test there appeared to be a likely point of limiting the number of factors to five. The rule directs one to look at a graph of eigenvalues and to stop factoring at the point where a leveling off occurs. The graph of eigenvalues is found in Figure 1, and shows that no more than five factors should be extracted.

Five factors were then targeted using a Varimax rotation. Only a factor loading equal to or greater than .40 was considered significant and used in the interpretation of the factors.

The five factors extracted from the 45 by 45 correlation matrix accounted for 46% of the total variance. The orthogonal solution is presented in Table 7.

These five factors and their factor names are discussed below. First of all, in considering the factor loadings for each factor, only items having a factor loading equal to or greater than .40 were accepted for the final test format. In addition any items with loadings equal to or greater than .40 on more than one factor were deleted. This resulted in 10 items being removed from the original inventory.

With these 10 items removed, an additional analysis indicated that the five factors now accounted for 48.65% of the variance. Table 8 presents the results for the Varimax rotation of the 35 items.

TABLE 7
FIVE FACTORS - ORTHOGONAL SOLUTION

ITEM	h^2	I	II	III	IV	V
1.	.51	.19	.07	.11	.16	.66
2.	.53	.09	.33	.02	.09	.64
3.	.49	.14	-.00	.00	.66	.19
4.	.41	-.04	.21	.13	.20	.56
5.	.47	.10	.24	.14	.62	.05
6.	.39	.02	.48	.04	.40	.07
7.	.34	.25	.07	.10	.47	.19
8.	.34	.05	.41	.20	.09	.35
9.	.42	.16	.51	.09	.19	.31
10.	.35	.34	.24	.30	.27	.13
11.	.44	-.13	.12	.59	.18	.18
12.	.46	.20	.42	.48	.23	.05
13.	.43	.50	.10	.17	.35	-.13
14.	.37	.40	.16	.42	.01	.08
15.	.41	.14	.44	.40	.18	.06
16.	.43	.07	.17	.61	-.08	.13
17.	.51	.43	.15	.55	-.09	.02
18.	.54	.06	.69	.08	.14	.18
19.	.40	-.06	.61	.10	-.02	.11
20.	.51	.15	.64	-.02	.03	.27
21.	.45	.27	.38	.34	-.32	.12
22.	.52	.10	.62	.20	.27	-.12
23.	.62	.15	-.13	.71	.11	.27
24.	.56	.23	-.06	.64	.22	.21

TABLE 7 (CONT'D)
FIVE FACTORS - ORTHOGONAL SOLUTION

ITEM	h^2	I	II	III	IV	V
25.	.49	.22	.42	.27	.43	.10
26.	.56	.70	.16	.18	.06	.01
27.	.48	.10	.36	.25	-.15	.51
28.	.44	.40	.43	-.01	.30	.08
29.	.45	.21	.35	.16	.50	.12
30.	.41	.54	.20	.24	.10	.11
31.	.46	.57	.08	.22	-.17	.22
32.	.66	.28	-.17	.72	.10	.18
33.	.28	.28	.20	.40	-.06	-.02
34.	.35	.12	.19	.53	.14	-.02
35.	.44	.16	.40	.08	.50	.02
36.	.50	.14	.61	-.10	.03	.31
37.	.47	.54	.31	.24	.14	-.03
38.	.60	.72	.23	.09	.10	.09
39.	.35	.46	-.01	.20	.25	.17
40	.46	.29	.42	.34	.27	-.09
41	.34	.12	-.02	.30	.02	.49
42.	.27	.41	.28	.06	.17	.01
43.	.68	.80	.03	.02	.21	.06
44.	.60	.75	-.05	-.02	.20	.08
45.	.50	.62	-.20	.22	.02	.15
Percent of Common Variance	100.00	27.073	23.778	21.904	14.628	12.620
Percent of Total Variance	46.018	12.458	10.942	10.080	6.731	5.807


TABLE 8
VARIMAX ROTATION - 35 ITEMS

ITEM	h^2	I	II	III	IV	V
1.	.53	.20	.11	.09	.67*	.14
2.	.54	.07	.36	.03	.61*	.20
3.	.54	.15	.04	.01	.17	.70*
4.	.50	-.06	.21	.11	.59*	.32
5.	.52	.12	.27	.13	.00	.64*
6.	.35	.26	.14	.11	.12	.48*
7.	.36	.07	.46*	.23	.29	-.03
8.	.43	.16	.51*	.07	.28	.24
9.	.44	-.11	.16	.60*	.14	.15
10.	.41	.53*	.09	.10	-.10	.32
11.	.42	.10	.21	.60*	.06	-.04
12.	.55	.08	.71*	.08	.10	.12
13.	.37	-.06	.59*	.07	.10	.06
14.	.52	.14	.68*	-.01	.20	.03
15.	.53	.12	.61*	.19	-.17	.29
16.	.65	.16	-.11	.72*	.27	.15
17.	.61	.25	-.04	.67*	.19	.26
18.	.54	.71*	.11	.16	.03	.03
19.	.55	.12	.39	.29	.49*	-.24
20.	.43	.26	.43*	.18	.04	.38
21.	.41	.55*	.19	.24	.11	.03
22.	.45	.58	.08	.16	.24	-.15
23.	.69	.30	-.15	.73*	.17	.13

TABLE 8 (CONT'D)
VARIMAX ROTATION - 35 ITEMS

ITEM	h^2	I	II	III	IV	V
24.	.35	.31	.21	.42*	-.06	-.17
25.	.46	.18	.25	.59*	-.12	-.01
26.	.54	.16	.66*	-.11	.25	-.01
27.	.48	.56*	.31	.20	-.06	.15
28.	.60	.73*	.23	.08	.08	.07
29.	.34	.48*	.04	.24	.11	.20
30.	.46	.34	.43*	.34	-.13	.17
31.	.38	.16	.07	.33	.46*	-.16
32.	.28	.44*	.30	.03	.00	.04
33.	.68	.81*	.04	.02	.06	.13
34.	.60	.73*	-.06	-.03	.08	.22
35.	.51	.61*	-.24	.18	.20	.09
Percent of Common Variance	100.00	29.789	23.340	20.628	13.664	12.579
Percent of Total Variance	48.65	14.49	11.35	10.04	6.65	6.12

FIGURE I



Factor 1

Items loading highest on Factor 1 were:

Breaking something which you have borrowed .81

Losing something valuable which someone close has given to you .73

Finding out you have walked out of a store with something and forgotten to pay for it .73

This first factor seems to have a common element of unintentionality. The three highest loadings all have a similar theme of forgetful, accidental behaviour. All are unintentional acts that disrupt our relationship with self and others.

Factor 1 seems to represent what Rest (1968) classified as guilt resulting from the anticipation of disapproval by others, whether real or imagined. Moral actions motivated by this anticipation were called Kohlberg Stage 3 moral judgments. Dabrowski (1977) speaks of a Level III experience where the individual is susceptible to social opinion and the influence of others. "Behavior is guided by what people will think or say or by the need for recognition and approval"(p. 41).

At Dabrowski's Level III moral concerns and moral responsibility begin to emerge. Guilt not only arises out of interpersonal relationships but

"guilt, here, acquires the deeper meaning of feeling responsible for failure in loyalty towards one's ideals" (ibid, p.80). Some items in Factor 1 seem to represent situations where guilt flows from dissatisfaction with oneself, for example, not doing as well as expected on a project .61.

Dabrowski (1977) points out that at Level III, one's behaviour is not exclusively governed by anticipated disapproval of others, but from a need to satisfy one's own ideals and expectations. Failure to live according to these ideals leads to a "disquietude" within oneself.

A common theme throughout this factor is the absence of willful intent. This may occur in the disruption of one's relationship with others, or the disappointment from betraying one's ideals. This factor is, therefore, called **non-intentional situational guilt** .

Factor 2

Items in Factor 2 seem to identify situations in our society where blame for moral culpability exists. Examples of this factor are:

Being involved in an abortion .71

Having sex with someone without being emotionally involved .68

Accepting a bribe .61

Factor 2 items in some ways represent what Rest (1968) speaks of as actions motivated by anticipation of dishonour and guilt flowing from bad consequences, that is, guilt over concrete harm done to others. Ogburn (1976) speaks of guilt at Level IV (Dabrowski) as a discomfort or anguish over actions that have occurred. It is a dissatisfaction with oneself over what is and what ought to be. "It is the shock of realization of one's unfaithfulness to an ideal of personality...and to a hierarchy of values" (Dabrowski, 1977, p.43).

Factor 2, in some way then, represents intentional moral failure. It is guilt arising from concrete harm done to others, guilt over one's unfaithfulness to personal values. This factor was, therefore, called **morally culpable guilt**.

Factor 3

Factor 3 is definitely concerned with social responsibility. Ogburn (1976) states that "higher forms of guilt involve discomfort over finding oneself undeservedly privileged or giving oneself more worth than one feels entitled to" (p 31). Items in Factor 3 certainly reflect this existential kind of guilt. Most of the items are inspired by Hoffman's concept of existential guilt

(Hoffman, 1975, 1976). For example,
 Seeing pictures of starving children .67
 Not contributing to charities when asked .60
 Hearing about tortures by governments on innocent
 people .72

Hence Factor 3 was called **existential guilt**.
 Factor 4

In Factor 4 items seem to reflect concern
 over intra-personal moral failures. For example,
 Having evil thoughts .67
 Taking too many drugs .61
 Drinking too much .59

This factor was called **intra-personal guilt**.
 Factor 5

The last factor (V) is a small one. Items
 here reflect guilt over inter-personal failures.
 These are:

Getting into an argument with a friend .70
 Finding out you have hurt someone's feelings .64
 Breaking up with someone who has been close to you
 .48

This last factor received the name
inter-personal guilt.

The five factors

The five factors, the percentage of total
 variance accounted for by each factor, and those
 items having a factor loading equal to or greater

than .40 were as follows:

I. Non-intentional situational guilt (14.49%).

Breaking something which you have borrowed (.81).

Losing something valuable which someone close has given to you (.73).

Finding out you have walked out of a store with something and forgotten to pay for it (.73).

Borrowing money from someone and suddenly realizing you forgot to pay him or her back (.71).

Not doing as well as you expected on a project (.61).

Breaking a law because you consider it unjust (.58).

Being involved in an accident where someone was seriously injured (.56).

Changing plans at the last minute which involve someone else (.55).

Saying things you don't mean when you are in an argument (.53).

Failing to reply to a letter from a close friend (.48).

Feeling so angry you would like to kill (.44).

II. Morally culpable guilt i.e., institutionalized blame for failure of duty, including guilt over concrete harm done to others (11.35%).

Being involved in an abortion (.71).

Having sex with someone without being emotionally involved (.68).

Accepting a bribe (.61).

Having sex with someone just for physical satisfaction (.66).

Cheating on your income taxes (.59).

Driving recklessly after drinking too much (.51).

Not going to church when you know you should (.46).

Hurting someone's feelings intentionally (.43).

Cheating (.43).

III. Existential guilt (10.04%).

Hearing/reading of bombings, killings, and maimings of innocent victims of war (.73).

Hearing about tortures by governments on innocent people (.72).

Seeing pictures of starving children (.67).

Having so much while others in the world have so little (.60).

Not contributing to charities when asked (.60).

Not taking part in community projects (.59).

Buying something which you cannot afford (.42).

IV. Intra-personal guilt (6.65%).

Having evil thoughts (.67).

Taking too many drugs (.61).

Drinking too much (.59).

Masturbating (.49).

Having sexual thoughts (.46).

V. Inter-personal guilt(6.12%).

Getting in an argument with a friend (.70).

Finding out you have hurt someone's feelings
(.64).

Breaking up with someone who has been close to you
(.48).

Further analysis: Reliability/Generalizability

The five factors having been identified, the MOSES was subjected to analysis for reliability. To determine internal consistency, the Alpha coefficient for each factor (subtest) and for the total test was found using the procedure suggested by Mulaik (1972);(DERS: Test 18). On the subtest the maximized alpha coefficients range from .868 to .604. The alpha based on all 35 items was .904 indicating that the MOSES has a high internal consistency. The coefficients of internal consistency for each subtest and the total test are shown in Table 9.

Further analysis: Factor Scores

How do theology students and engaged couples differ in their experience of guilt? To answer this question Mulaik (1972, p.322) suggests obtaining scores of the subjects on the factor components and using these scores as the

TABLE 9

ALPHA COEFFICIENTS

THEOLOGY STUDENTS AND ENGAGED COUPLES (n=236)

TEST	MEANS	ALPHA	THEOLOGY STUDENTS AND ENGAGED COUPLES MAXIMIZED ALPHA COEFFICIENT	TEST	MEANS	ALPHA	MAXIMIZED ALPHA COEFFICIENT
FACTOR I				FACTOR III			
Item 1	3.5			Item 1	2.7		
2	3.3			2	2.5		
3	3.3			3	2.9		
4	2.4			4	3.1		
5	3.5			5	2.7		
6	3.1			6	2.9		
7	2.9			7	2.2		
8	3.5			Total	19.1	.798	.804
9	3.5						
10	3.6			FACTOR IV			
11	2.8						
Total	35.6	.862	.868				
FACTOR II				FACTOR V			
Item 1	3.1			Item 1	2.8		
2	4.1			2	3.6		
3	4.2			3	3.3		
4	2.8			4	2.8		
5	3.9			5	1.8		
6	3.8			Total	14.3	.692	.697
7	4.1						
8	3.8						
9	3.8						
Total	33.6	.813	.816				
				GRAND TOTAL			
				114.1 ALPHA BASED ON ALL ITEMS			
				.904			

dependent variables for further analysis of variance for differences between groups of subjects. In order to obtain the factor scores of the 236 volunteers, factor scores estimates were calculated using the regression method (Mulaik, 1972; DERS: Fact 23). These scores were obtained by setting the mean at 50 and the standard deviation at 10. Following the calculation of the factor scores, analysis of variance between the two groups was obtained. Results are shown in Table 10.

The significant ($p < .001$) differences between theology students and engaged couples on the first two factors are noteworthy. It appears that engaged couples experience significantly greater guilt from unintentional failure, whereas theology students report greater guilt in situations where intentional moral irresponsibility exists.

B. The External Component

Analysis of Results: Pearson correlations

Table 11 shows the average age of the sample, the means and variances for the five subtests of the MOSES and the three subtests of the Mosher test for all subjects.

Tables 12, 13 and 14 show the relationship among the five subtests of the MOSES and the three subscales of the Mosher for males, females, and the total sample.

The inter-correlations between the MOSES scale 2 and the three Mosher subscales are significant ($p < .01$). It also appears, as pointed out in Table 14, that the subscales of

TABLE 10

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

THEOLOGY SAMPLE AND ENGAGED COUPLES n=236

	FACTOR SCORE MEANS		ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE		
	Theology sample	Engaged Couples	Degrees of Freedom	F-Score	Probability
Factor I	44.5	53.7	1	234	60.16
Factor II	53.7	47.5	1	234	24.06
Factor III	51.4	49.0	1	234	3.16
Factor IV	50.4	49.7	1	234	.26
Factor V	48.9	50.7	1	234	1.87

MEAN = 50.0

STANDARD DEVIATION = 10.0

TABLE 11
PEARSON CORRELATIONS
VALIDATION SAMPLE GROUP
MOSES - MOSHER

Sex	Mean Scores		AND	Standard Deviations	
	Moses			Mosher	
	Subtest	\bar{x} S.D.		Subtest	\bar{x} S.D.
Males n=22	1	35.0 8.5			
	2	32.6 8.3	1	17.3	16.1
	3	19.2 5.1	2	3.7	20.1
	4	16.9 3.7			
	5	12.1 2.7	3	23.9	20.0
Females n=23	1	38.4 7.7			
	2	38.9 5.1	1	23.6	10.5
	3	20.1 6.6	2	8.6	16.1
	4	18.4 4.1			
	5	13.3 1.7	3	26.6	13.0
Total Group n=45	1	36.8 8.3			
	2	35.8 7.5	1	20.5	13.9
	3	19.7 5.9	2	6.2	18.4
	4	17.7 4.0			
	5	12.7 2.3	3	25.3	16.9

TABLE 12
PEARSON CORRELATIONS
MALE SAMPLE GROUP n=32

		MOSES - MOSHER							
Variable		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Moses:	Subtest 1	1.000							
2. Moses:	Subtest 2	.325							
3. Moses:	Subtest 3	.693**	.381						
4. Moses:	Subtest 4	.423*	.326	.380					
5. Moses:	Subtest 5	.631**	.334	.284	.445*				
6. Mosher:	Moral/Conscience Guilt	.063	.528**	.143	-.089	.015			
7. Mosher:	Sex Guilt	-.165	.616**	-.087	.018	-.037	.542**		
8. Mosher:	Hostility Guilt	.110	.455**	-.081	-.001	-.032	.646**	.460*	1.000

$p < .05$
 $p < .01$

TABLE 13
PEARSON CORRELATIONS
FEMALE SAMPLE GROUP n=23
MOSES - MOSHER

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Moses: Subtest 1	1.000							
2. Moses: Subtest 2	.457*							
3. Moses: Subtest 3	.632*	.463*						
4. Moses: Subtest 4	.282	.491*	.541**					
5. Moses: Subtest 5	.600**	.513*	.400*	.020				
6. Mosher: Moral/Conscience Guilt	.129	.524**	.441*	.351	.140			
7. Mosher: Sex Guilt	.138	.396*	.309	.369	.017	.274		
8. Mosher: Hostility Guilt	.135	.285	-.084	-.112	.261	.355	-.082	1.000

$p < .05$
 $p < .01$

TABLE 14
PEARSON CORRELATIONS
VALIDATION SAMPLE GROUP n=45
MOSES - MOSHER

Females n=23									
Males n=22									
Variable		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Moses:	Subtest 1	1.000							
2. Moses:	Subtest 2	.413**							
3. Moses:	Subtest 3	.649**	.387**						
4. Moses:	Subtest 4	.373*	.416**	.481**					
5. Moses:	Subtest 5	.630**	.446**	.324*	.288*				
6. Mosher:	Moral/Conscience Guilt	.130	.561**	.278	.137	.107			
7. Mosher:	Sex Guilt	-.006	.539**	.125	.205	.017	.460**		
8. Mosher:	Hostility Guilt	.131	.400**	-.071	-.032	.074	.558**	.295	1.000

$p < .05$
 $p < .01$

both the Mosher and the MOSES are highly correlated with each other.

When the male sample is studied separately, similar high correlations occur between subscale 2 on the MOSES and the three Mosher subscales. In addition the inter-scale correlations within the inventory are positive and significant for the Mosher subscales. This positive inter-scale correlation is true for the MOSES but only significant for the first scale which correlates significantly with scales 3, 4, 5. Scales 5 and 4 are also significantly correlated at the .05 level.

The female sample group varies slightly from the male group in significant correlations. One interesting difference is the relationship existing between Scale 2I -- guilt arising from existential concerns -- and the moral-conscience guilt scale of Mosher's inventory. This score approaches significance in the total sample group.

Analysis of results: Canonical Correlation

Table 15 shows the canonical correlation between the two scales, the chi-square of each new correlation and the significance of the chi-square values.

The canonical correlation between the Mosher Forced-Choice Guilt Scale and the MOSES (.705) was significant for the first pair of composites ($p < .001$). The eigenvector weights contributing the most to the first canonical correlation were the Moral-Conscience Guilt and Sex Guilt scales from the Mosher test and subtest 2 (Factor

TABLE 15
CANONICAL CORRELATION
MOSHER AND MOSES

NUMBER OF ROOTS REMOVED	CORRESPONDING CANONICAL <u>R</u>	CHI-SQUARE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	PROBABILITY
0	.705	40.5	15	< .001
1	.483	12.7	8	.123
2	.217	2.0	3	.581

2) on the MOSES -- intentional moral failure. There was some positive contribution by subtest 3 (Factor 3) -- a normalized weight of .158. This third factor reflects guilt over existential social issues/responsibilities. The other subscales of the MOSES contributed negative weights to this first canonical-correlation.

Apart from the significant canonical-correlation of the first pair of canonical variates between the Mosher and MOSES, no further significant combinations seem to exist.

C. The relationship between guilt and moral reasoning

In the second chapter of this study the question was raised whether guilt as moral sentiment related to moral reasoning. The relationship appeared to have a sound theoretical basis. It appeared that what individuals perceived to be right or wrong would be influenced by their emotional reactions to the situations and/or dilemmas. The relationship between affect and reasoning had both a logical and philosophical basis. However, it was also discovered that little empirical effort had been devoted to an investigation of this relationship.

The relationship between guilt and moral reasoning was studied by correlating scores on the MOSES and the Rest test obtained by two groups -- ethics students and professional engineers. Results are shown in Table 16.

The Hotelling's T^2 statistic for the two groups had the value of 73.082; the associated F was 6.09 with degrees of

freedom of 11 and 109. The probability of exceeding such an F value would be less than 0.001. Therefore the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the scores of the two groups is rejected.

It becomes obvious in studying Table 16 that, although the null hypothesis is rejected for the two groups, the only significant difference between subscale means occurs on subtest 2 on the guilt scale. Ethics students report more guilt over issues involving concrete harm done to others and intentional moral irresponsibility.

To help understand the parallel nature of the mean scores, Figure 2 illustrates the means for the two groups. It is apparent from the illustration that, indeed, the two groups are different in their scores yet follow a similar pattern. Also the greater discrepancy, and significant difference, on variable (8) becomes more readily noticeable.

Is the difference on Factor 2 (subtest 2)-- guilt arising from intentional moral failure -- due to sex difference? To answer this question the male and the female ethics students' scores were compared separately with the 55 professional engineers. Results are shown in Tables 17 and 18. For the male group comparison, (Table 17), the null hypothesis was rejected for the total sample at the .01 level of significance -- indicating two separate populations. However, there were no significant differences between group means for any of the eleven subscales.

TABLE 16
HOTTELING'S T^2
ENGINEERS AND ETHICS STUDENTS (n=121)

SUBTEST	GROUP MEANS		T^2		
	Students n=66	Engineers n=55	T^2	Degrees of Freedom 1	Degrees of Freedom 2
Defining Issues	1	3.20	10.35	11	109
	2	9.70	1.65	11	109
	3	15.97	5.61	11	109
	4	15.24	.59	11	109
	5	6.50	4.49	11	109
	6	5.64	3.12	11	109
Moses: Factor	1	35.92	1.08	11	109
	2	35.67	28.84	11	109
	3	19.27	11.10	11	109
	4	14.49	12.48	11	109
	5	11.64	11.25	11	109
TOTAL GROUP			73.08	11	109
					Probability
					.579
					1.000
					.920
					1.000
					.964
					.992
					1.000
					$\leq .010^*$
					.520
					.417
					.508
					$< .001^*$


TABLE 17
HOTTELING'S T^2
MALE SAMPLE

SUBTEST	GROUP MEANS		T^2		
	Students n=22	Engineers n=55	T^2	Degrees of Freedom 1	Degrees of Freedom 2
Defining Issues 1	1.36	3.20	8.11	11	65
2	8.46	8.51	.00	11	65
3	16.27	19.07	2.26	11	65
4	15.50	14.35	.54	11	65
5	6.64	5.20	2.89	11	65
6	5.96	4.66	2.96	11	65
Moses: Factor 1	34.78	34.36	.04	11	65
2	34.05	27.73	9.79	11	65
3	18.77	15.75	4.04	11	65
4	14.64	11.84	7.75	11	65
5	11.05	9.23	2.16	11	65
TOTAL GROUP			31.81	11	65
					Probability
					.789
					1.000
					.998
					1.000
					.995
					.994
					1.000
					.667
					.979
					.813
					.999
					<.01*

TABLE 18
HOTTELING'S T^2
FEMALE SAMPLE AND ENGINEERS

SUBTEST	GROUP MEANS		T^2			
	Female Students n=44	Engineers n=55	T^2	Degrees of Freedom 1	Degrees of Freedom 2	Probability
Defining Issues 1	1.91	3.20	6.21	11	87	.894
	2	8.51	2.97	11	87	.994
	3	19.07	5.30	11	87	.938
	4	14.35	.37	11	87	1.000
	5	6.43	3.32	11	87	.990
	6	5.48	1.84	11	87	.999
Moses: Factor	1	36.50	1.52	11	87	1.000
	2	36.48	26.14	11	87	.026*
	3	19.52	9.50	11	87	.664
	4	14.41	9.44	11	87	.669
	5	11.93	12.76	11	87	.419
	TOTAL GROUP		69.67	11	87	<.001*

FIGURE 2



It is worth noting the significant difference between the groups on Factor 2 of the guilt scale, which was observed when both male and female subjects were included, did not occur in this analysis.

In the female group comparison (Table 18), the null hypothesis for the total sample was rejected at the .001 level, and a significant difference between female students and engineers was found on Factor 2 (subtest 2) of the MOSES.

It is reasonable to conclude that a significant difference exists between female ethics students and male engineers in their experience of guilt arising from morally culpable failures. Means for female students and engineers on MOSES subtest 2 were 38.5 and 27.7, respectively.

Analysis of results: Canonical correlation

Following the suggestion of Cooley & Lohnes (1962), a canonical correlation was carried out to determine the extent of the relationship between the MOSES measurement of guilt and Rest's Defining Issues Test.

Table 19 shows the canonical correlations between the two scales, the chi-square of each new correlation, and the significance of the chi-square values. The canonical correlation between the MOSES and Rest's test is .347. The probability of obtaining a correlation of that magnitude is .194, and therefore the observed correlation may be considered non-significant.

TABLE 19
CANONICAL CORRELATION
MOSES AND REST'S DEFINING ISSUES TEST
ENGINEERS AND ETHICS STUDENTS (n=121)

NUMBER OF ROOTS REMOVED	CORRESPONDING CANONICAL <u>R</u>	CHI-SQUARE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	PROBABILITY
0	.347	36.4	30	.194
1	.262	21.7	20	.359
2	.247	13.5	12	.335
3	.207	6.2	6	.397
4	.102	1.2	2	.548

The Pearson correlations of the subscales for the two inventories are given in Table 20. Only one correlation appears to be significant -- Factor 1 guilt and Stage 4 moral reasoning (.234, $p < .05$). Other correlations are low or negative and none are significant at the conventional .05 level.

Since the female sample accounted for one significant difference in guilt, it was logical to look at the correlations of this group's subtests. When the female ethics student sample was studied independently, no significant Pearson correlations emerged. Table 21 shows the correlations for the female group on the two tests. The canonical correlation was similarly non-significant. The correlation of the first pair of canonical variates was .480, which has a probability of .90.

A further canonical correlational study was carried out with the MOSES and the Defining Issues Test. Table 22 shows the results. The canonical correlation was .587, which is not significant at traditional levels.

Similarly non-significant was the canonical correlation between the Mosher Forced-Choice Guilt Scale and the Rest test. Table 23 shows that the correlation between these two scales was .563 ($p = .236$) on the first set of variables.

TABLE 20
PEARSON CORRELATION
REST'S DEFINING ISSUES TEST AND MOSES
ENGINEERS AND ETHICS STUDENTS (n=121)

VARIABLES	DEFINING ISSUES TEST	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 4	Stage 5A	Stage 5B	Stage 6
MOSES Factor I		.02	.03	.23*	-.08	-.16	-.03
Factor II		-.12	-.05	.14	-.01	.00	.06
Factor III		-.16	.08	.06	-.02	-.08	-.05
Factor IV		-.07	.11	.19	-.15	-.12	.07
Factor V		-.07	.12	.12	-.08	-.01	.01

*p < .05

TABLE 21

PEARSON CORRELATION

REST'S DEFINING ISSUES TEST AND MOSES

FEMALE SAMPLE n=44

VARIABLES	DEFINING ISSUES TEST	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 4	Stage 5A	Stage 5B	Stage 6
MOSES Factor I		-.02	.17	.02	-.04	-.09	-.18
Factor II		-.03	-.17	.11	.05	.03	-.06
Factor III		-.06	.13	.18	-.13	-.28	-.05
Factor IV		.02	.07	.22	-.15	-.21	-.06
Factor V		-.08	.22	.03	-.16	.02	-.16

TABLE 22
CANONICAL CORRELATION
MOSES AND REST'S DEFINING ISSUES TEST
VALIDATION SAMPLE (males=22 females=23)

NUMBER OF ROOTS REMOVED	CORRESPONDING CANONICAL <u>R</u>	CHI-SQUARE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	PROBABILITY
0	.587	41.81	30	.074
1	.553	25.37	20	.188
2	.418	11.11	12	.520
3	.248	3.63	6	.727
4	.170	1.15	2	.564

TABLE 23
CANONICAL CORRELATION
MOSHER'S FORCED-CHOICE GUILT SCALE
AND
REST'S DEFINING ISSUES TEST
VALIDATION SAMPLE (males=22 females=23)

NUMBER OF ROOTS REMOVED	CORRESPONDING CANONICAL <u>R</u>	CHI-SQUARE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	PROBABILITY
0	.563	21.91	18	.236
1	.358	6.63	10	.760
2	.167	1.13	4	.889

D. Summary

In summary, this chapter has outlined the results of several statistical analyses. Initially a factor analysis was carried out on an original 45-item scale of guilt-provoking situations. Five factors were identified as meaningful dimensions of the guilt experience. Ten items were found either not loading significantly on a factor or loading on more than one factor. These were removed. This refinement led to a final draft of the MOSES with 35-items representing 35 guilt-evoking stimuli.

Reliability and validity testing followed. Tests of internal consistency were high with an overall alpha coefficient of .904. A validation study was carried out between the Mosher Guilt Scale and the MOSES. It was found that subscales of both inventories correlated highly. This correlation was also significant for MOSES scale 2 and the three Mosher subscales - moral/conscience guilt, sex guilt, and hostility guilt. Inter-scale correlations for both inventories were equally high.

In the process of this analysis it was discovered that the MOSES, when administered to theology students and engaged couples, showed a significant difference between the two groups in their experience of guilt. Theology students reported higher mean guilt on scale 2 -- referring to guilt arising from intentional moral irresponsibility; engaged couples, on the other hand, reported higher mean scores for Factor 1 -- guilt arising from unintentional failures.

The final stage of analysis was to determine whether or not a relationship existed between the experience of guilt and moral reasoning. This relationship was found to be, in general, non-significant. A moderately significant relationship was found between Factor 1 guilt and Stage 4 of Rest's Moral Reasoning test ($p < .05$).

Two sample groups, ethical philosophy students and professional engineers, appeared to have similar scores on both the Defining Issues Test and the Moral Sentiment Scale (MOSES). A difference on one variable -- scale 2 guilt -- was significant for the two groups. This difference was found to be related to gender. The significance for this is attributed to the female sample group within the ethical philosophy students. Male students and engineers had similar scores.

Chapter V

Discussion and Implications

A. Summary

The main objective of this study has been to examine the experience of guilt as moral sentiment. This objective included: (1) a look at the phenomenon of guilt; (2) an effort at extending the notion of guilt beyond the psychoanalytic model; (3) investigating guilt as part of moral consciousness, including its relationship to moral development; and (4) constructing a valid and reliable measure of guilt as moral sentiment.

The phenomenon of guilt was seen to be the existentialists' definition of the human condition and the psychoanalysts' symptom of disease. The existentialist defined the human condition as guilty, while the Freudian attempted to anesthetize guilt feelings. For the existentialist, moral choice originated from the individual's perception of what would best fulfill his existence, and man was guilty because he did not live up to his full potential. The psychoanalytic model saw guilt as originating from the internalization of external expectations. This internalization caused conflict between primitive desire and a fear of feeling guilty. Moral choice was some kind of resolution of this conflicting tension.

Both the existentialist and psychoanalytic models were seen to be limited in their analysis of guilt. The existentialist model seemed weak because of its inability to move from defining a condition of the human species to determining the specific content of guilt. The psychoanalytic model, on the other hand, seemed to deny the possibility of moral responsibility and moral culpability. In between these two positions was a third point of view which advocated guilt as a positive healthy human experience originating from specific situations of moral failure.

Guilt was understood by a number of authors as a dynamic, positive affect, leading one to and promoting moral integrity. As such, guilt was part of moral consciousness, a moral affect resulting from specific moral failures. The operational definition of guilt used for this study flowed from this perspective and viewed guilt as moral sentiment arising from specific failures which caused real unnecessary harm to self, another, and/or the environment.

With guilt defined as moral sentiment resulting from moral choices, the question was raised regarding the interrelationship of moral affect and moral reasoning in moral decisions. As Sullivan *et al.* (1971), point out, there exists basic disagreement in moral philosophy between those who place emphasis on the rational and conceptual aspects (e.g. Kohlberg) and those who emphasize emotional aspects (e.g. Peters).

The argument is an old one. David Hume in the 18th century said that unless there was feeling in moral decisions then morality was empty, and if morality was simply a question of feeling then there would be many subjective inequities. More recently philosophers, like Bernard Lonergan (1972, 1974), have argued for a balance between feeling and cognition. Lonergan claims that value is apprehended in feeling, so that the first movement of one's moral choice results from an apprehension occurring within a feeling context. The next movement in making a moral choice is deliberation -- "deliberation...unifies knowing and feeling" (Lonergan, 1974, p. 277).

Is cognition primary in moral judgments? Do feelings play a role? This philosophical chestnut is far from being resolved. However, the epistemology offered by Lonergan and his followers is providing an exciting new insight into the argument. Suffice it to say that there is a relationship between moral affect and moral reasoning, the nature of which remains to be clarified.

A possible contribution may result from studying the relationship of a moral sentiment such as guilt and moral reasoning. This has been a secondary goal of this study. In order to adequately study guilt as moral emotion it was deemed necessary to construct a valid and reliable measure of guilt. The secondary objective would be achieved through a correlational study of guilt with moral reasoning.

The summary of the results of the test construction and validation are discussed in the following paragraphs.

B. Findings and Discussion

The findings of this present study are summarized in connection with the research question outlined at the end of Chapter II.

Question 1

Can a valid and reliable measure of guilt be constructed to reflect guilt as moral sentiment?

The answer to this question is yes. An attempt was made to construct a measure of guilt that would reflect the experience of guilt as moral affect. This was accomplished following the suggestion of Jane Loevinger (1957). Loevinger describes a three-tier process necessary in the construct validity of a psychological test, namely, (1) the substantive component, (2) the structural component, and (3) the external component.

The substantive component deals with content validity. Content validity means that items in the inventory truly represent the trait to be measured. The content for the MORal SEntiment Scale (MOSES) was derived from several sources. In keeping with the operational definition of guilt as moral sentiment arising from specific moral failures, the content of the inventory had to reflect reaction to specific moral situations. As well, the focus had to be on

true/objective guilt reactions rather than state-trait or predispositions to guilt.

In order to achieve content validity, 45 items describing guilt-provoking situations were assembled from a variety of sources thought to adequately represent a wide spectrum of theoretical positions. Item content had to be consistent with the operational definition given. After initial factor analysis, the scale was reduced to 35 guilt-provoking stimuli by eliminating ten items which did not load significantly on any factor (greater than .40) or were loading on more than one factor.

The structural component relates to the reliability and construct validity of the instrument. Tests of internal consistency based on all 35 items was .904. The initial factor analysis was carried out after administration of the MOSES to 236 volunteers. Five factors were eventually extracted which could be meaningfully interpreted as representing various aspects of the guilt experience. These factors were:

Factor 1, characterized by items dealing with unintentional failures in generally expected behaviours of others and self. This Factor was called Non-intentional situational guilt.

Factor 2 seemed to identify situations where intentional failure and responsibility for failure occurred. This Factor was called morally culpable guilt.

Factor 3 reflected social responsibility and using Hoffman's

(1976) terminology was called existential guilt.

Factors 4 and Factor 5 reflected personal morality issues; Factor 4 reflecting concern over intra-personal moral failure, and Factor 5 reflecting concern over inter-personal failures. These factors, therefore, were called Intra-personal guilt and Inter-personal guilt, respectively.

To determine internal consistency the Alpha coefficient for each subtest (factor) and for the total test was found. The overall Alpha coefficient was .904, indicating a very high degree of internal consistency.

The external component of construct validity involved criterion-related validity testing. This was achieved by administering the MOSES along with Mosher's Forced-choice guilt scale to a group of adult volunteers. Pearson correlations and canonical correlations were analyzed. Inter-scale correlations were high and significant ($p < .01$) between the MOSES Factor 2 (Morally culpable guilt) and the three Mosher subscales (Sex guilt, Moral/Conscience guilt, and Hostility guilt). The canonical correlation between the Mosher scale and the MOSES was .705 -- significant ($p < .01$) for the first pair of composites. Contributing most to this first canonical were the Moral/conscience guilt and Sex guilt scales from the Mosher test and subtest 2 (Factor 2) on the MOSES.

These highly significant correlations would indicate that the MOSES is, indeed, measuring aspects of guilt that are measured by the Mosher inventory. In addition, the MOSES

is measuring aspects of the guilt experience not included in the Mosher test.

The MOSES appears to be a valid and reliable measure of guilt as moral sentiment.

Question 2

Is guilt multidimensional?

Two main distinctions are common among writers regarding the subjective experience of guilt, namely, true/objective guilt and false/neurotic guilt. Further sub-divisions of each category are infrequent. Mosher (1965, 1966) has constructed a measure for three types of guilt -- moral/ conscience, sex, and hostility guilt. The present study has expanded the multidimensional aspect of true/objective guilt even further.

The five factors of guilt extracted from the MOSES confirm the multi dimensionality of the guilt experience. The five factors were:

1. Non-intentional guilt
2. Morally culpable guilt
3. Existential guilt
4. Intra-personal guilt
5. Inter-personal guilt

This multidimensional characteristic of guilt is typified by Factor 1 and Factor 3. In Factor 1 guilt is identified in situations where unintentional failure occurs as well as in situations where moral irresponsibility exists. One can experience guilt by accidentally breaking a neighbour's

mower and a different kind of guilt for not calling the police when vandals break into a neighbour's house. Intentionality colours the experience.

In Factor 3, guilt differs according to perceived expectations and responsibility. One can feel guilt for contributing to inequities in the world by not living a simpler lifestyle, while another may feel no such guilt. One may experience guilt for arguing with a friend and another for being forgetful of a birthday. One's sensitivities vary depending on perceived obligations and duties.

This variety of guilt-provoking situations is to some extent provided by the MOSES. Obviously the sampling of guilt-provoking stimuli is limited but the resulting five factors do confirm that guilt is not a monolithic experience.

Question 3

Is guilt experienced differently by people in various walks of life?

This question is an elaboration of the preceding one. The factor analysis did outline at least five dimensions to the guilt experience. The question now asked is whether these dimensions are experienced with the same degree of intensity by various groups? The answer is mixed.

Four different groups helped to answer this question. It was speculated that theology students would have a conception of morality and subsequent guilt experience different from the general population. A comparison between

theology students and a sample of people in general was selected as an interesting contrast. As well, it was speculated that engineers, coming from a strong science background, would have a different perspective on morality and feelings of guilt than people with an arts background, for example people studying moral philosophy. Therefore, the first two groups were theological students and engaged men and women. Scores were obtained from these volunteers on the factor components and these scores were used as dependent variables for an analysis of variance.

A significant ($p < .01$) difference between theology students and engaged couples did occur on the first two factors. In this case engaged couples reported significantly greater guilt for unintentional failures (Factor 1), whereas theology students showed higher mean scores for guilt arising from moral irresponsibility (intentional culpability), Factor 2.

In the second set -- engineers and students studying ethics -- a similar significant difference occurred on the first two factors.

A Hotelling's T^2 was carried out between the two groups, and the null hypothesis that there was no difference between them was rejected. However, on the individual subtests, significant differences were found to be limited to one variable, Factor 2 on the guilt scale. Factor 2 dealt with issues of moral irresponsibility. Ethics students reported more guilt in this area than did the engineers.

It would seem that one could conclude from the findings that guilt is generally experienced in much the same way by the four groups sampled. Whether a broader generalization could be made to the general population would require more extensive study. Suffice it to say that there do seem to be some interesting dissimilarities in guilt arising from moral culpability (Factor 2) and some differences in unintentional guilt (Factor 1). The remaining three dimensions of guilt have similar mean scores across the four groups.

Question 4

Are there sex differences in the experience of guilt?

As pointed out above, a significant difference ($p < .01$) was found between the group of engineers and ethics students on Factor 2 of the MOSES. Ethics students reported greater guilt in areas of intentional moral failure than did the engineers.

When the ethics student groups were divided into male and female samples and each group was compared separately with the male engineers, one sex difference was observed. For both sexes, the Hotelling's T^2 test indicated that students and engineers represented two different populations, as far as their performances on the total scales was concerned. However, while there were no significant differences between engineers and male students on any of the subtests, there was one difference between engineers and females. On Factor 2 (subtest 2) of the MOSES -- morally culpable guilt -- females made significantly

higher mean scores. It appears that the difference on this scale between the total student group and the engineers was due to the tendency of female students to score high.

Is there a sex difference in the experience of guilt? The answer is a qualified yes. Female ethics students in the present sample did differ significantly from male engineers in "morally culpable guilt". To what extent one can extrapolate from these results to generalize further is unclear. Additional research is still needed.

Question 5

Does a positive relationship exist between guilt and moral reasoning?

In the second chapter of this study, attention was given to situating guilt as moral sentiment within the context of moral consciousness. This led to a discussion of moral affect and moral cognition in moral choice. To what extent are moral affect and moral reasoning related? It was noted that there was adequate philosophical justification for asserting such a relationship.

The question raised was whether there is any empirical evidence for such a relationship. Early studies by Ruma and Mosher (1967) demonstrated that such a relationship exists. However, Kurtines and Grief (1974) criticised the study by pointing out that all but one of the subjects were at Kohlberg's Stage 3 or below. D'Augelli and Cross (1975) found high scorers on the Mosher guilt scale oriented at Stage 3 as well. There was less mean guilt for individuals

at higher and lower stages.

The present study found quite different results. In a comparison of Rest's Defining Issues Test and the MOSES measurement of guilt, no significant correlations were found for the canonical composites. This was true for the ethics students group, the engineer group, and the validation study group of adult volunteers. The canonical correlation between the Mosher Forced-choice Guilt Scale and the Rest test was also non-significant.

Among the Pearson correlations between the Rest and MOSES subscales, one was significant, that being Factor 1 and Stage 4 moral reasoning ($p < .05$). The individual at Stage 4 expresses an awareness of law, a sense of obligation, and responsibility to maintain law and order. Factor 1 guilt seems to reflect an awareness of guilt when unintentional failures occur in generally expected behaviours of self and others. Could one's sense of duty extend beyond black and white situations to include even unintentional grey situations of moral failure? In this case one would avoid censure by others in society even for unintentional failure in order to avoid subsequent guilt. Piaget(1932) would refer to such a situation as an example of heteronomous morality where intentionality in moral evaluation is not taken into account.

The significant correlation between Factor 1 and Stage 4 was quite unexpected and differs from previous research. Two reasons may account for this. First of all, a different

instrument was used to measure moral reasoning for this present study, that is, Rest's Defining Issues Test (DIT). In the Ruma & Mosher (1967) and D'Augelli & Cross (1975) studies Kohlberg's moral reasoning test was used. As Rest says: "...what Kohlberg's system calls Stage 3 may be keyed Stage 4 on the DIT" (1979a, p. 154), and again "subjects scored at Stage 3 on the Kohlberg test tended to choose Stage 4 or 5 items on the DIT on the same dilemma" (ibid., p. 157).

Rest explains that this is due to the nature of the two tests. The DIT is essentially a recognition task while the Kohlberg test is a production task. Kohlberg's test gives credit for a stage only when an individual can express, explain, justify, and argue against other alternatives. As Rest (1979a) points out, many people are able to organize their actions and make discriminations at various stages without being able to verbalize the reasoning behind their behaviour.

"A subject may have a cognitive structure at different levels, that is, a subject may first have a structure in a way that can be manifested non-verbally, and then with further development, may manifest the structure verbally, being able to talk about it, explain it, and justify it." (p. 61)

Rest in his research has found that subjects give higher ratings at higher stages than the stages they could paraphrase. This would explain why "in comparisons between the DIT (a recognition-rating task) and Kohlberg's test (a spontaneous production and justification task), the DIT credits subjects with higher forms of thinking than Kohlberg's test" (Rest, 1979a, p. 63).

The present study differed from previous ones in that it showed a positive relationship between guilt and Stage 4 rather than Stage 3. Although Stage 4 is still within the conventional level of moral reasoning (Level II), it advances over Stage 3 in that Stage 3 fails to define guidelines of moral interaction beyond face-to-face encounters. Stage 4 interactions are determined by a sense of duty by which people can anticipate another's expectations without knowing the other. When understood in these terms, it makes sense to see unintentional moral failure as a source of guilt because it represents an infraction of expectations of others whom one may or may not know.

A second source of the significant correlation may have been sex differences. It appears that the male sample group accounted for the positive correlation between Factor 1 and Stage 4 moral reasoning. When the female sample scores were compared, no significant correlations emerged. The positive correlation was not duplicated with the 45 subjects who volunteered for the validation study.

It seems one would have to be cautious regarding the significance of these results. There appears to be support for some significant relationship between Stage 4 moral reasoning as measured by the DIT and Factor 1 guilt. However, sex influences may modify this relationship. As well, the correlation at .23 ($p < .05$) remains weak. The coefficient of determination (Kerlinger, 1973) indicates that only 5.3% of variance is accounted for by the correlation coefficient. Therefore, conclusions have to be tempered and generalization modified.

Does a positive relationship exist between guilt and moral reasoning? For the most part one would have to answer in the negative. The present measure of guilt does not relate significantly with Rest's measure of moral reasoning. Only one dimension of guilt (non-intentional situational guilt) seems to have some degree of relationship with Stage 4 moral reasoning, and this for male subjects only.

Question 6

Is guilt experienced differently by people in various Stages of moral development?

The evidence on this question is inconclusive. In the main factor analysis study between engaged couples and theology students it was discovered that there was a different experience of guilt between the two groups. Theology students made higher mean scores on guilt arising from moral irresponsibility, while engaged couples reported higher guilt for unintentional failures.

Of interest here is the notion of intentionality in the experience of guilt. According to Piaget (1932), intentionality represents a higher level of cognitive development because the individual has moved beyond one's own egoism to take on the role of another.

"...the basic epistemological thesis in Piaget's genetic perspective is objectivity through decentration, a normative process of cognitive development moving from egocentrism to self-transcendence" (Conn, 1978, p. 323).

This movement from "egocentricism" also occurs in moral judgments. Piaget's (1932) experiment with children helps to explain this developmental process. When asked to judge a child who accidentally broke a large number of cups and a child who intentionally broke one, younger children in the heteronomous stage of moral reasoning based their judgments on quantity rather than intent; the opposite occurred in older children who had achieved a more autonomous morality.

Extending Piaget's insight to the guilt experience, one could state that a greater sensitivity to "morally culpable guilt" represents an increase in maturity over concerns with guilt arising from unintentional failures. In other words, theology students who showed greater mean scores on guilt arising from intentional irresponsibility would have a more autonomous morality than engaged couples who expressed greater sensitivity to unintentional errors.

In this sense guilt is experienced differently by people in various stages of moral development. However, as pointed out in response to question 5, the relationship between guilt and stages of moral development was not established by the present testing methods. Whether guilt is experienced differently by people in various stages remains a question.

Question 7

Does the relationship between guilt and moral reasoning follow a developmental pattern?

The results of this study lead to no definitive conclusions. One is led to conclude that only a tenuous relationship exists between one aspect of the guilt experience and one stage of moral reasoning. Overall there appears to be no relationship, and therefore no developmental pattern, of relationship between guilt and moral reasoning.

This conclusion is obviously contrary to the findings of other studies in the literature. Why? The answer may be twofold: (1) the nature of the sampling, and (2) the nature of the measuring instruments.

The five sample groups used (theology students, ethics students, engaged couples, engineers, and religious education students) are in many ways homogeneous. For the most part, all are of similar age, above average ability, well-educated, middle-class, white, sharing the same culture, and likely sharing similar North American values.

While this homogeneity of groups is advantageous for preventing confounding factors from entering into measurement interpretation, at the same time it restricts generalization to other segments of society. In addition, since all were young adults, the difficulty in determining a developmental pattern is exacerbated. Chances are that the majority would reflect a similar developmental stage. In fact, the most preferred answers of these groups were Stage 4 and 5A. Perhaps if more individuals preferring Stage 3 answers had been sampled, relationship between guilt as conformity to expectations (Factor 1) and moral reasoning would have been found.

The instruments used for testing may also have failed to detect the true relationship of moral affect and moral cognition in moral choice. The MOSES was based on a personal response pattern to situations in which the individual could or might experience guilt. The moral reasoning test in contrast, dealt with hypothetical situations in which one had to make a judgment. If the moral cognition tasks had been more existential in their orientation, the results may have also reflected a closer tie-in with affect. What would I, as an individual, do in such and such a situation? What level of guilt would I experience? Answers to these kinds of questions may have resulted in the finding of a stronger relationship between moral affect and moral reasoning.

C. Implications

This present work has implications in two broad areas: (1) in therapy, and (2) in education. First, implications for therapy and counseling psychology will be considered.

The primary goal of this study has been to enlarge the concept of guilt. Since the Freudian revolution in psychology, therapists have often considered guilt a symptom of illness, but there is an unfortunate shortcoming in this approach. There can, of course, be neurotic guilt. We can feel guilt for failures when there is nothing objective to account for these feelings. This calls for therapy. True guilt, on the other hand, signals that something is wrong; that we have indeed done "real unnecessary harm" to another, to self, and/or the environment (Maguire, 1978). True guilt is the result of a split between what we are and what we do, between what we know to be right and what we choose to do instead. It is a basic human experience, a moral sentiment within our moral consciousness.

As such guilt is not a symptom of disease but the diagnostic pain of moral health. As Narramore (1974a) states, objective guilt results in a positive self-corrective attitude; we recognize our failures but continue to respect ourselves and maturely plan ways to improve our behaviour.

The first implication of this understanding of guilt as moral sentiment concerns how we as therapists deal with

guilt. If we see guilt, as this study suggests, as moral sentiment, then our approach is to respect rather than anesthetize the individual's experience of guilt. As Lifton (1979) has advocated, we move from seeing guilt as a static, deadening force, and view it instead as transforming energy. Guilt feelings can be an animating force, pushing the individual from a state of self-condemnation into one of change and renewal. Could it not be our role as therapists to help the individual tap into this transforming power of guilt?

Also in the area of therapy is an implication deriving from intentionality. The first two factors uncovered by this study have pointed to intent as a basic distinction between two dimensions of guilt. Some individuals experience a great deal of remorse for unintentional failure, for example, being involved in an accident where someone was seriously injured, or not doing as well as expected on a project. This remorse can lead to prolonged self-condemnation which immobilizes the individual. To help the individual move to an awareness of the distinction between unintentional situational guilt and morally culpable guilt may be of crucial import in helping the individual come to terms with one's guilt.

There also seems to be some indication that intense guilt feelings over unintentional acts reflect a less mature moral consciousness. Perhaps the goal of therapy, as well as of moral education is to facilitate an awareness of guilt as

both unintentional and intentional failure. From this awareness the individual in therapy can be aided to develop a more refined moral affect and moral sensitivity. This may take the form of an increased awareness of the multidimensionality of guilt and how conscious behaviour can effect real unnecessary harm from commission as well as omission. If there is a relationship between moral affect and moral decision-making, it could be argued that a broader understanding of guilt could also lead to more mature moral choices.

The second area for implication of this study is an educational one. Kohlberg (1980b) claims that the goal of civic education should be to introduce students to higher stages of moral reasoning. He advocates "active social participation as well as the learning of analytic understandings"(p. 464). This seems to be a highly intellectual exercise and is consistent with earlier research by Blatt and Kohlberg (1975), who studied the effect of classroom moral discussions upon a group of children eleven and twelve years old. They found that children exposed to higher levels of moral reasoning recognized and incorporated these higher levels. In contrast, controls exhibited no significant changes.

The inherent weakness of Kohlberg's approach is the belief that higher levels of moral reasoning result in a similar change of moral choice and behaviour.

As was noted earlier, Conn (1978) has pointed out that mature moral judgments are more than the application of logical principles to moral dilemmas. There is also the dimension of affectivity. This was also the point of view of Peters, Simpson, Sullivan, and Rich. Jones (1963) and more recently Wilcox (1979) have advocated the role feelings should play in the learning experience. Feelings, both positive and negative, have been neglected in education. Helping students learn to identify their feelings, verbalize these feelings, and deal adequately with them is the goal of holistic educational programs.

Perhaps one implication drawn from this present study is that guilt as moral affect should be part of a healthy look at moral choice and moral responsibility. While examining various moral dilemmas, the consequences and ramifications for the individual as well as society should be looked at. In addition, the guilt arising from any unnecessary harm done self, others, and/or the environment should be confronted and discussed. This approach to moral education implies a move from purely cognitive moral education to more holistic curricula.

D. Further research

The main achievement of this study has been the construction of a moral sentiment scale that has isolated three main areas of the guilt experience -- unintentional

situational guilt, morally culpable guilt, and existential guilt. While the MOSES has given a different perspective on the experience of guilt, many areas need further study and exploration.

The first area for further research may be in seeking additional items for Factors 4 and 5 -- guilt resulting from intra-personal and inter-personal failures. These infractions of personal ethics and how they relate to other dimensions of guilt are still unclear.

Second, the area of guilt arising from passive participation remains to be explored. Oftentimes we experience guilt for acts of omission rather than commission, for example, someone lies in obvious pain on the sidewalk and we turn around to avoid being involved. This kind of failure by what is left undone often reveals our true moral sensitivity. Sensitivity to these acts of omission may also reflect moral maturity. As Hoffman (1976) speculates, guilt over inaction is likely to be more advanced developmentally than guilt over actual commission.

Akin to guilt from omission is guilt from contrived ignorance. This ignorance is not so much an absence of information but avoidance of such information. As such it is a choice we make. "Don't tell me about the horrors in such and such or the starvation over there". The broad unawareness of injustices, and consequent uninvolvedness, betray a kind of crassness, a guilt through deliberate ignorance.

A final area of research may be that of collective guilt. Collective guilt also arises from omission but at a political level. It results from failure on our part to take appropriate action when rights are violated, principles ignored. To what extent this dimension of guilt can be empirically researched needs further investigation.

In conclusion, then, it is hoped that this study has demonstrated that guilt is a complex multidimensional human experience. Guilt represents real pain and calls not so much for therapy but for change and renewal. Guilt can be a dynamic part of our moral consciousness, a vital emotion. To use Gaylin's phrase (1979), guilt can be the "guardian of our goodness". In short, objective guilt is a real phenomenon within our moral sensitivity. It is a moral sentiment.

Bibliography

- Abrahamson, P.R., Mosher, D.L., Abramson, L.M., & Woychowski, B. Personality correlates of the Mosher Guilt Scales. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, 1977, 41, 375-381.
- Aiken, H.D. The levels of moral discourse. *Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy*, 1952, 62, 235-248.
- Alston, W.P. Comments on Kohlberg's 'From Is to Ought'. In I. Mishel (Ed.), *Cognitive Development and Epistemology*. New York: Academic Press, 1971.
- Aron, I.E. Moral Education: The formalist tradition and the Deweyan alternative. In B. Munsey (Ed.), *Moral Development, Moral Education, and Kohlberg*. Birmingham: Religious Education Press, 1980.
- Bandura, A. & Walters, R.H. The influence of social reinforcement and the behavior of models in shaping children's moral judgments. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1963, 67, 274-281.
- Bandura, A. & Walters, R.H. *Social learning and Personality development*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963.
- Blatt, M. & Kohlberg, L. The effects of classroom moral discussion upon children's level of moral judgment. *Journal of Moral Education*, 1975, 45, 129-161.
- Buber, M. Guilt and Guilt Feelings. Maurice Friedman trans., *The Knowledge of Man*. Maurice Friedman (Ed.). New York: Harper & Row, 1965.
- Carr, C. Kierkegaard: On Guilt. *Journal of Psychology and theology*, 1973, 1, 15-21.

- Conn, W.E. The ontological ground of value. *Theological Studies*, 1978,39,313-335.
- Conn, W.E. Bernard Lonergan and authenticity: The search for a valid criteria of the moral life. *The American Benedictine Review*, 1979,30,301-321.
- Conn, W.E. Affectivity in Kohlberg & Fowler. *Religious Education*, 1981,76,33-43.
- Cooley, W.W. & Lohnes, P.R. *Multivariate Procedures for the Behavioral Sciences*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962.
- Cowan, P.A. *Piaget: With Feeling*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1978.
- Dabrowski, K. & Piechowski, M. *Theory of Levels of Emotional Development* (Vol. 1). Oceanside, New York: Dabor Science Publ., 1977.
- D'Augelli, J.F., & Cross, A.R. Moral reasoning and premarital sexual behavior: Toward reasoning about relationships. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1977,33,46-66.
- Davidson, M.L. The internal structure and the properties of the Defining Issues Test. In J.R. Rest, *Development in judging moral issues*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979.
- Doran, R.M. *Subject and Psyche: Ricoeur, Jung, and the Search for Foundations*. Washington: University Press of America, 1979.
- Dyer, W. *Your Erroneous Zones*. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1976.
- Evans, D.R., Jessup, B.A., & Hearn, M.T. Development of a reaction inventory to measure guilt. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, 1975,39,421-423.
- Eisenberg, N.H. *The development of prosocial moral judgment*

and its correlates. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Xerox University Microfilms, 1976.

Eysenck, H.J. The biology of morality. In T. Lickona (Ed.), *Moral development and behavior*. New York; Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1976, 108-123.

Fehr, L.A., & Stamps, L.E. The Mosher Guilt Scales: A construct validity extension. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, 1979, 43, 257-260.

Ferguson, G.A. *Statistical Analysis in Psychology and Education*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1971.

Fowler, J., & Keen, S. *Life maps: Conversations on the journey of faith*. Waco, Texas: Word Books, 1978.

Frankl, V.E. *Psychotherapy and Existentialism*. New York: Simon Shuster, 1967.

Freedman, J.L. Transgression, complicity and guilt. In J. Macauley & L. Berkowitz (Eds.), *Altruism and helping behavior*. New York: Academic Press, 1970.

Freud, S. *Civilization and its discontents*. London: Hogarth, 1930.

Freud, S. Origin of the sense of guilt. In H. Morris (Ed.), *Guilt and shame*. Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1971.

Frings, M.S. Insight. *Philosophy Today*, 1970, 14, 106-115.

Gaylin, W. *Feelings: Our vital signs*. New York: Harper Row, 1979.

Gilligan, C. In a different voice: Women's conceptions of self and morality. *Harvard Educational Review*, 1977, 47, 481-517.

Gilligan, J. Beyond morality: Psychoanalytic reflections on shame, guilt and love. In T. Lickona (Ed.), *Moral*

development and behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1976.

Goldiamond, I. Moral development: A functional analysis. *Psychology Today*, 1968, 4, 31ff.

Hague, W.J. Postive disintegration and moral education. *Journal of Moral Education*, 1976, 5, 231-240.

Hoffman, M.L. Moral development. In P.H. Mussen (Ed.), *Carmichael's manual of child psychology* (2nd ed.) (Vol. 2). New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1970.

Hoffman, M.L. Developmental synthesis of affect and cognition and its implications for altruistic motivation. *Developmental Psychology*, 1975, 11, 607-622.

Hoffman, M.L. Empathy, role taking, guilt, and development of altruistic motives. In T. Lickona (Ed.), *Moral development and behavior*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1976.

Hoffman, M.L. Personality and social development. In M.R. Rosenzweig & L.W. Porter (Eds.), *Annual Review of Psychology*, 1977, 28, 295-321.

Hoffman, M.L. Toward a developmental theory of prosocial motivation. In S. Cohen, & T.J. Comiskey (Eds.), *Child development: Contemporary Perspectives*, Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock, 1976.

Jones, R.M. *Fantasy and Feelings in Education*. New York: New York University Press, 1978.

Kerlinger, F.N. *Foundations of behavior research* (2nd ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1973.

Kim J.O. & Mueller, C.W. *Factor Analysis: Statistical Methods and Practical Issues*. London: Sage Publications, 1978.

Kohlberg, L. The development of children's orientation

towards a moral order. *Vita Humana*, 1963, 6, 11-33.

Kohlberg, L. Moral development. In D.L. Sills (Ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (Vol. 10). New York: Macmillan Company, 1968.

Kohlberg, L. From is to ought: How to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral development. In T. Mischel (Ed.), *Cognitive development and epistemology*. New York: Academic Press, 1971.

Kohlberg, L. Education, moral development and faith. *Journal of Moral Education*, 1974, 4, 5-16.

Kohlberg, L. Moral stages and moralization: The cognitive-developmental approach. In T. Lickona. (Ed.), *Moral development and behavior: Theory, research and social issues*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1976.

Kohlberg, L. Stages of Moral development as a basis for moral education. In B. Munsey (Ed.), *Moral Development, Moral Education, and Kohlberg*. Birmingham: Religious Education Press, 1980.

Kurtines, W., & Grief, E.B. The development of moral thought: Review and evaluation of Kohlberg's approach. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1974, 81, 453-470.

Lickona, T. (Ed.). *Moral development and behavior: Theory research and social issues*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1976.

Locke, D. Cognitive stages or developmental phases? A critique of Kohlberg's stage-structural theory of moral reasoning. *Journal of Moral Education*, 1979, 8, 168-181.

Loevinger, J. Objective tests as instruments of psychological theory. *Psychological Reports*, 1957, 3, 635-694.

- Lonergan, B.J. *Method in Theology*. New York: Herder & Herder, 1972.
- Lonergan, B.J. *A Second Collection*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974.
- Lonergan, B.J. The human good. *Humanitas*, 1979, 15, 113-126.
- Maguire, D.C. *The Moral Choice*. New York: Doubleday, 1978.
- McKenzie, J.G. *Guilt: Its meaning and significance*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1962.
- Menninger, K. *Whatever became of sin?* New York: Hawthorn Bailes, 1973.
- Meynell, H.A. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan*. McMillan: London, 1976.
- Morano, D.V. *Existential guilt: A phenomenological study*. Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1973.
- Morrison, D.F. *Multivariate Statistical Methods*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1976.
- Mosher, D.L. Interaction of fear and guilt in inhibiting unacceptable behavior. *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 1965, 29, 161-167.
- Mosher, D.L. The development and multitrait-multimethod matrix analysis of three measures of three aspects of guilt. *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 1966, 30, 25-29.
- Mosher, D.L. The meaning and measurement of guilt. In C.E. Izard (Ed.), *Emotions in personality and psychopathology*. New York: Plenum, 1979.
- Mosher, D.L. & Abrahamson, P.R. Subjective sexual arousal to films of masturbation. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, 1977, 45, 796-807.

- Mowrer, O.H. *Learning theory and personality dynamics*. New York: Ronald Press, 1950.
- Mowrer, O.H. *The crisis in psychiatry and religion*. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961.
- Mulaik, S.A. *The Foundations of Factor Analysis*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1972.
- Munsey, B. Cognitive-development theory of moral development: Metaethical issues. In B. Munsey (Ed.), *Moral Development, Moral Education, and Kohlberg*. Birmingham: Religious Education Press, 1980.
- Narramore, B. Guilt: Where Theology and Psychology Meet. *Journal of Psychology and Theology*, 1974, 2, 18-25.
- Narramore, B. Guilt: Its universal hidden presence. *Journal of Psychology and Theology*, 1974b, 2, 104-115.
- O'Connor, J. On doing religious ethics. *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, 1979, 7, 81-94.
- Ogburn, M.K. Differentiating guilt according to the theory of positive disintegration. *Unpublished doctoral dissertation*, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1976.
- O'Grady, K.E., & Janda, L.H. Psychometric correlates of the Mosher forced choice guilt inventory. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, 1978, 46, 1581-1582.
- Otterbacher, J.L. & Muntz, D.L. State-trait measure of experiential guilt. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, 1973, 40, 115-121.
- Persons, R.W. The Mosher Guilt Scale: Theoretical formulation, research review and normative data. *Journal of Projective Techniques and Personality Assessment*, 1970, 34, 266-269.

- Peters, R.S. Moral development: A plea for pluralism. In T. Mischel (Ed.), *Cognitive development and epistemology*. New York: Academic Press, 1971.
- Peters, R.S. *Reason and Compassion*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973.
- Peters, R.S. *Psychology and Ethical Development*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1974.
- Piaget, J. *Judgment and reasoning in the child*. New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams, 1964.
- Piaget, J. *The moral judgment of the child*. New York: The Free Press, 1965. (Originally published, 1932).
- Piaget, J. Piaget's Theory. In P.H. Mussen (Ed.), *Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology*, Vol. 1. New York: Wiley, 1970.
- Piechowski, M.M. A theoretical and empirical approach to the study of development. *Genetic Psychology Monograph*, 1975, 92, 231-297.
- Piechowski, M.M. Levels of development and forms of overexcitability. In K. Dabrowski & M. Piechowski. *Theory of Levels of Emotional Development*, Vol. 1. Oceanside, New York: Dabor Science Publ., 1977.
- Rawlings, E.I. Reactive guilt and anticipatory guilt in altruistic behavior. In J. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz (Eds.), *Altruism and helping behavior*. New York: Academic Press, 1970.
- Regan, J.W. Guilt, perceived injustice, and altruistic behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1971, 17, 124-129.
- Rest, J.R. *Developmental hierarchy in preference and comprehension of moral judgment*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1968.

- Rest, J.R., Cooper, D., Coder, R., Masanz, J., & Anderson, D. Judging the important issues in moral dilemmas - an objective measure of development. *Developmental Psychology*, 1974, 10, 491-501.
- Rest, J.R., Longitudinal study of the Defining Issues Test of moral judgment: A strategy for analyzing developmental change. *Developmental Psychology*, 1975, 11, 738-748.
- Rest, J.R. *Development in judging moral issues*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979a.
- Rest, J.R. *Revised Manual for the Defining Issues Test*. Minneapolis: Minnesota Moral Research Projects, 1979b.
- Rich, J.M. Moral education and the emotions. *Journal of Moral Education*, 1980, 9, 81-87.
- Rosen, B. Moral dilemmas and their treatment. In B. Munsey (Ed.), *Moral Development, Moral Education, and Kohlberg*. Birmingham: Religious Education Press, 1980.
- Ruma, E.H., & Mosher, D.L. Relationship between moral judgment and guilt in delinquent boys. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 1967, 72, 122-127.
- Scheler, M.F. *Man's Place in Nature*. (Trans. Hans Meyerhoff). New York: Noonday Press, 1962.
- Simpson, E.L. A holistic approach to moral development and behavior. In T. Lickona (Ed.), *Moral development and behavior*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1976.
- Staub, E. *Positive social behavior and morality*. New York: Academic Press, 1979.
- Stein, E.V. *Guilt: Theory and therapy*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968.

Stern, K. *The Third Revolution*. New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1954.

Sullivan, E.V. A study of Kohlberg's structural theory of moral development: A critique of liberal social science ideology. *Human Development*, 1977, 20, 352-376.

Turiel, E. Developmental processes in the child's moral thinking. In P. Mussen, E.J. Langer, & M. Corrington (Eds.). *Trends and Issues in developmental psychology*. New York: Holt, 1969.

Wilcox, M.M. *Developmental journey: A guide to development of logical and moral reasoning and social perspective*. Nashville: Abingdon, 1979.

APPENDIX 1

The Moral Sentiment Scale - Version 1Please check one:

Male _____

Female _____

Your age: _____

The following situations produce more or less guilt in people. Please respond to them by rating the amount of guilt you would feel IF these situations happened to you.

RESPONSES - no guilt at all	a little	a fair amount	a lot	very much guilt feeling
1	2	3	4	5
1. Having evil thoughts.				1 2 3 4 5
2. Taking too many drugs.				1 2 3 4 5
3. Getting in an argument with a friend				1 2 3 4 5
4. Drinking too much.				1 2 3 4 5
5. Finding out you have hurt someone's feelings				1 2 3 4 5
6. Driving away from the scene of an accident				1 2 3 4 5
7. Breaking up with someone who has been close to you				1 2 3 4 5
8. Not going to church when you know you should.				1 2 3 4 5
9. Driving recklessly after drinking too much				1 2 3 4 5
10. Doing something which you know you should not have done				1 2 3 4 5
11. Having som much while others in the world have so little				1 2 3 4 5
12. Lying to someone to get out of a jam.				1 2 3 4 5
13. Saying things you don't mean when you are in an argument				1 2 3 4 5
14. Telling a white lie.				1 2 3 4 5

(turn the page)

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| 15. Revealing a secret. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 16. Not contributing to charities when asked. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 17. Surviving or escaping from an accident while someone else
is hurt. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 18. Being involved in an abortion. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 19. Cheating on your income taxes. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 20. Having sex with someone without being emotionally involved | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 21. Being stopped by the police for speeding. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 22. Accepting a bribe. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 23. Hearing about tortures by governments on innocent people | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 24. Seeing pictures of starving children. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 25. Hitting someone in anger. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 26. Borrowing money from someone and suddenly realizing you
forgot to pay them back. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 27. Masturbating | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 28. Walking out of a store without paying for something | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 29. Hurting someone's feelings intentionally | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 30. Changing plans at the last minute which involve someone
else. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 31. Breaking a law because you consider it unjust | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 32. Hearing/reading of bombings, killings, and maimings of
innocent victims in war e.g. Vietnam, Cambodia. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 33. Buying something which you cannot afford. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 34. Not taking apart in community projects. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 35. Being mean to someone for no reason at all. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 36. Having sex with someone just for physical satisfaction | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 37. Being involved in an accident where someone was seriously
injured. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 38. Finding out you have walked out of a store with something
and forgotten to pay for it. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 39. Failing to reply to a letter from a close friend. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 40. Cheating. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 41. Having sexual thoughts. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 42. Feeling so angry you would like to kill. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 43. Breaking something which you have borrowed. | 1 2 3 4 5 |

(turn the page)

44. Losing something valuable which someone close has given
to you.

1 2 3 4 5

45. Not doing as well as you expected on a project.

1 2 3 4 5

THANK YOU

Appendix 2 . The Moral Sentiment Scale - version 2 .

The Moral Sentiment Scale - Version 2

The following situations produce more or less guilt in people. Please respond to them by rating the amount of guilt you would feel IF these situations happened to you.

RESPONSES -	no guilt at all	a little	a fair amount	a lot	very much guilt feeling
	1	2	3	4	5
1. Having evil thoughts					1 2 3 4 5
2. Taking too many drugs.					1 2 3 4 5
3. Getting in an argument with a friend					1 2 3 4 5
4. Drinking too much					1 2 3 4 5
5. Finding out you have hurt someone's feelings					1 2 3 4 5
6. Breaking up with someone who has been close to you.					1 2 3 4 5
7. Not going to church when you know you should.					1 2 3 4 5
8. Driving recklessly after drinking too much					1 2 3 4 5
9. Having so much while others in the world have so little					1 2 3 4 5
10. Saying things you don't mean when you are in an argument					1 2 3 4 5
11. Not contributing to charities when asked					1 2 3 4 5
12. Being involved in an abortion					1 2 3 4 5
13. Cheating on your income taxes.					1 2 3 4 5
14. Having sex with someone without being emotionally involved					1 2 3 4 5
15. Accepting a bribe					1 2 3 4 5
16. Hearing about tortures by governments on innocent people					1 2 3 4 5
17. Seeing pictures of starving children					1 2 3 4 5
18. Borrowing money from someone and suddenly realizing you forgot to pay them back.					1 2 3 4 5
19. Masturbating					1 2 3 4 5
20. Hurting someone's feelings intentionally.					1 2 3 4 5
21. Changing plans at the last minute which involve someone else					1 2 3 4 5
22. Breaking a law because you consider it unjust					1 2 3 4 5
23. Hearing/reading of bombings, killings, and maimings of innocent victims in war, e.g. Vietnam, Cambodia.					1 2 3 4 5

(turn the page)

cont'd

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| 24. Buying something which you cannot afford | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 25. Not taking part in community projects | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 26. Having sex with someone just for physical satisfaction | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 27. Being involved in an accident where someone was seriously injured. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 28. Finding out you have walked out of a store with something and forgotten to pay for it | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 29. Failing to reply to a letter from a close friend | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 30. Cheating | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 31. Having sexual thoughts | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 32. Feeling so angry you would like to kill. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 33. Breaking something which you have borrowed. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 34. Losing something valuable which someone close has given to you. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 35. Not doing as well as you expected on a project. | 1 2 3 4 5 |

Thank you for participating
in this research

APPENDIX 3

THE DEFINING ISSUES TEST:

AN OBJECTIVE TEST OF MORAL JUDGMENT DEVELOPMENT

James R. Rest

* * * * *

In this questionnaire you will be asked to give your opinions about several stories. Here is a story as an example.

Frank Jones has been thinking about buying a car. He is married, has two small children and earns an average income. The car he buys will be his family's only car. It will be used mostly to get to work and drive around town, but sometimes for vacation trips also. In trying to decide what car to buy, Frank Jones realized that there were a lot of questions to consider. Below there is a list of some of these questions.

If you were Frank Jones, how important would each of these questions be in deciding what car to buy?

Instructions for Part A: (Sample Question)

On the left hand side check one of the spaces by each statement of a consideration. (For instance, if you think that statement #1 is not important in making a decision about buying a car, check the space on the right.)

IMPORTANCE:

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
				✓	1. Whether the car dealer was in the same block as where Frank lives. (Note that in this sample, the person taking the questionnaire did not think this was important in making a decision.)
✓					2. Would a used car be more economical in the long run than a new car. (Note that a check was put in the far left space to indicate the opinion that this is an important issue in making a decision about buying a car.)
		✓			3. Whether the color was green, Frank's favorite color.
				✓	4. Whether the cubic inch displacement was at least 200. (Note that if you are unsure about what "cubic inch displacement" means, then mark it "no importance.")
✓					5. Would a large, roomy car be better than a compact car.
				✓	6. Whether the front connibillias were differantial. (Note that if a statement sounds like gibberish or nonsense to you, mark it "no importance.")

Instructions for Part B: (Sample Question)

From the list of questions above, select the most important one of the whole group. Put the number of the most important question on the top line below. Do likewise for your 2nd, 3rd and 4th most important choices. (Note that the top choices in this case will come from the statements that were checked on the far left-hand side--statements #2 and #5 were thought to be very important. In deciding what is the most important, a person would re-read #2 and #5, and then pick one of them as the most important, then put the other one as "second most important," and so on.)

<u>MOST</u>	<u>SECOND MOST IMPORTANT</u>	<u>THIRD MOST IMPORTANT</u>	<u>FOURTH MOST IMPORTANT</u>
<u>5</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>

-2-

HEINZ AND THE DRUG

In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost to make. He paid \$200 for the radium and charged \$2000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about \$1000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and began to think about breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

Should Heinz steal the drug? (Check one)

_____ Should steal it _____ Can't decide _____ Should not steal it

IMPORTANCE:

Great Much Some Little No

					1. Whether a community's laws are going to be upheld.
					2. Isn't it only natural for a loving husband to care so much for his wife that he'd steal?
					3. Is Heinz willing to risk getting shot as a burglar or going to jail for the chance that stealing the drug might help?
					4. Whether Heinz is a professional wrestler, or has considerable influence with professional wrestlers.
					5. Whether Heinz is stealing for himself or doing this solely to help someone else.
					6. Whether the druggist's rights to his invention have to be respected.
					7. Whether the essence of living is more encompassing than the termination of dying, socially and individually.
					8. What values are going to be the basis for governing how people act towards each other.
					9. Whether the druggist is going to be allowed to hide behind a worthless law which only protects the rich anyhow.
					10. Whether the law in this case is getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member of society.
					11. Whether the druggist deserves to be robbed for being so greedy and cruel.
					12. Would stealing in such a case bring about more total good for the whole society or not.

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most important _____

Second Most Important _____

Third Most Important _____

Fourth Most Important _____

STUDENT TAKE-OVER

At Harvard University a group of students, called the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), believe that the University should not have an army ROTC program. SDS students are against the war in Viet Nam, and the army training program helps send men to fight in Viet Nam. The SDS students demanded that Harvard end the army ROTC training program as a university course. This would mean that Harvard students could not get army training as part of their regular course work and not get credit for it towards their degrees.

Agreeing with the SDS students, the Harvard professors voted to end the ROTC program as a university course. But the President of the University stated that he wanted to keep the army program on campus as a course. The SDS students felt that the President was not going to pay attention to the faculty vote or to their demands.

So, one day last April, two hundred SDS students walked into the university's administration building, and told everyone else to get out. They said they were doing this to force Harvard to get rid of the army training program as a course.

Should the students have taken over the administration building? (Check one)

 Yes, they should take it over Can't decide No, they shouldn't take it over

IMPORTANCE:

Great Much Some Little No

					1. Are the students doing this to really help other people or are they doing it just for kicks?
					2. Do the students have any right to take over property that doesn't belong to them?
					3. Do the students realize that they might be arrested and fined, and even expelled from school?
					4. Would taking over the building in the long run benefit more people to a greater extent?
					5. Whether the president stayed within the limits of his authority in ignoring the faculty vote.
					6. Will the takeover anger the public and give all students a bad name?
					7. Is taking over a building consistent with principles of justice?
					8. Would allowing one student take-over encourage many other student take-overs?
					9. Did the president bring this misunderstanding on himself by being so unreasonable and uncooperative?
					10. Whether running the university ought to be in the hands of a few administrators or in the hands of all the people.
					11. Are the students following principles which they believe are above the law?
					12. Whether or not university decisions ought to be respected by students.

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most Important

Second Most Important

Third Most Important

Fourth Most Important

-4-

ESCAPED PRISONER

A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he escaped from prison, moved to a new area of the country, and took on the name of Thompson. For 8 years he worked hard, and gradually he saved enough money to buy his own business. He was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and gave most of his own profits to charity. Then one day, Mrs. Jones, an old neighbor, recognized him as the man who had escaped from prison 8 years before, and whom the police had been looking for.

Should Mrs. Jones report Mr. Thompson to the police and have him sent back to prison?
(Check one)

_____ Should report him _____ Can't decide _____ Should not report him

IMPORTANCE:

Great Much Some Little No

	1. Hasn't Mr. Thompson been good enough for such a long time to prove he isn't a bad person?
	2. Everytime someone escapes punishment for a crime, doesn't that just encourage more crime?
	3. Wouldn't we be better off without prisons and the oppression of our legal systems?
	4. Has Mr. Thompson really paid his debt to society?
	5. Would society be failing what Mr. Thompson should fairly expect?
	6. What benefits would prisons be apart from society, especially for a charitable man?
	7. How could anyone be so cruel and heartless as to send Mr. Thompson to prison?
	8. Would it be fair to all the prisoners who had to serve out their full sentences if Mr. Thompson was let off?
	9. Was Mrs. Jones a good friend of Mr. Thompson?
	10. Wouldn't it be a citizen's duty to report an escaped criminal, regardless of the circumstances?
	11. How would the will of the people and the public good best be served?
	12. Would going to prison do any good for Mr. Thompson or protect anybody?

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most Important _____

Second Most Important _____

Third Most Important _____

Fourth Most Important _____

THE DOCTOR'S DILEMMA

A lady was dying of cancer which could not be cured and she had only about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of pain-killer like morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask the doctor to give her enough morphine to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain and that she was going to die in a few months anyway.

What should the doctor do? (Check one)

_____ He should give the lady an overdose that will make her die _____ Can't decide _____ Should not give the overdose

IMPORTANCE:

Great Much Some Little No

					1. Whether the woman's family is in favor of giving her the overdose or not.
					2. Is the doctor obligated by the same laws as everybody else if giving her an overdose would be the same as killing her.
					3. Whether people would be much better off without society regimenting their lives and even their deaths.
					4. Whether the doctor could make it appear like an accident.
					5. Does the state have the right to force continued existence on those who don't want to live.
					6. What is the value of death prior to society's perspective on personal values.
					7. Whether the doctor has sympathy for the woman's suffering or cares more about what society might think.
					8. Is helping to end another's life ever a responsible act of cooperation.
					9. Whether only God should decide when a person's life should end.
					10. What values the doctor has set for himself in his own personal code of behavior.
					11. Can society afford to let everybody end their lives when they want to.
					12. Can society allow suicides or mercy killing and still protect the lives of individuals who want to live.

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most Important _____
 Second Most Important _____
 Third Most Important _____
 Fourth Most Important _____

-6-

WEBSTER

Mr. Webster was the owner and manager of a gas station. He wanted to hire another mechanic to help him, but good mechanics were hard to find. The only person he found who seemed to be a good mechanic was Mr. Lee, but he was Chinese. While Mr. Webster himself didn't have anything against Orientals, he was afraid to hire Mr. Lee because many of his customers didn't like Orientals. His customers might take their business elsewhere if Mr. Lee was working in the gas station.

When Mr. Lee asked Mr. Webster if he could have the job, Mr. Webster said that he had already hired somebody else. But Mr. Webster really had not hired anybody, because he could not find anybody who was a good mechanic besides Mr. Lee.

What should Mr. Webster have done? (Check one)

_____ Should have hired Mr. Lee _____ Can't decide _____ Should not have hired him

IMPORTANCE:

Great Much Some Little No

					1. Does the owner of a business have the right to make his own business decisions or not?
					2. Whether there is a law that forbids racial discrimination in hiring for jobs.
					3. Whether Mr. Webster is prejudiced against orientals himself or whether he means nothing personal in refusing the job.
					4. Whether hiring a good mechanic or paying attention to his customers' wishes would be best for his business.
					5. What individual differences ought to be relevant in deciding how society's roles are filled?
					6. Whether the greedy and competitive capitalistic system ought to be completely abandoned.
					7. Do a majority of people in Mr. Webster's society feel like his customers or are a majority against prejudice?
					8. Whether hiring capable men like Mr. Lee would use talents that would otherwise be lost to society.
					9. Would refusing the job to Mr. Lee be consistent with Mr. Webster's own moral beliefs?
					10. Could Mr. Webster be so hard-hearted as to refuse the job, knowing how much it means to Mr. Lee?
					11. Whether the Christian commandment to love your fellow man applies in this case.
					12. If someone's in need, shouldn't he be helped regardless of what you get back from him?

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most Important _____

Second Most Important _____

Third Most Important _____

Fourth Most Important _____

NEWSPAPER

Fred, a senior in high school, wanted to publish a mimeographed newspaper for students so that he could express many of his opinions. He wanted to speak out against the war in Viet Nam and to speak out against some of the school's rules, like the rule forbidding boys to wear long hair.

When Fred started his newspaper, he asked his principal for permission. The principal said it would be all right if before every publication Fred would turn in all his articles for the principal's approval. Fred agreed and turned in several articles for approval. The principal approved all of them and Fred published two issues of the paper in the next two weeks.

But the principal had not expected that Fred's newspaper would receive so much attention. Students were so excited by the paper that they began to organize protests against the hair regulation and other school rules. Angry parents objected to Fred's opinions. They phoned the principal telling him that the newspaper was unpatriotic and should not be published. As a result of the rising excitement, the principal ordered Fred to stop publishing. He gave as a reason that Fred's activities were disruptive to the operation of the school.

Should the principal stop the newspaper? (Check one)

_____ Should stop it _____ Can't decide _____ Should not stop it

IMPORTANCE:

Great Much Some Little No

	1. Is the principal more responsible to students or to the parents?
	2. Did the principal give his word that the newspaper could be published for a long time, or did he just promise to approve the newspaper one issue at a time?
	3. Would the students start protesting even more if the principal stopped the newspaper?
	4. When the welfare of the school is threatened, does the principal have the right to give orders to students?
	5. Does the principal have the freedom of speech to say "no" in this case?
	6. If the principal stopped the newspaper would he be preventing full discussion of important problems?
	7. Whether the principal's order would make Fred lose faith in the principal.
	8. Whether Fred was really loyal to his school and patriotic to his country.
	9. What effect would stopping the paper have on the student's education in critical thinking and judgments?
	10. Whether Fred was in any way violating the rights of others in publishing his own opinions.
	11. Whether the principal should be influenced by some angry parents when it is the principal that knows best what is going on in the school.
	12. Whether Fred was using the newspaper to stir up hatred and discontent.

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most Important _____
 Second Most Important _____
 Third Most Important _____
 Fourth Most Important _____

APPENDIX 4

THE ASSOCIATION OF
PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS.

TELEPHONE 426-3990



GEOLOGISTS AND GEOPHYSICISTS
OF ALBERTA

(ADMINISTRATORS OF "THE ENGINEERING AND RELATED PROFESSIONS ACT" OF ALBERTA)

1010 ONE THORNTON COURT
EDMONTON, ALBERTA
T5J 2E7

January 19, 1981

Dear Member:


One aspect of professionalism is morality -- which is revealed by how one would act in "difficult" situations.

I have examined Mr. Douziech's study and feel that it is technically satisfactory. Please take the time to complete his questionnaire. It will be going to only about 100 randomly selected members.

Mr. Douziech has agreed to prepare a summary of the results of his study for publication in the Mini-PEGG.

Individual names will not be used at any stage besides mailing.

Yours truly,


L. L. Williams, Ph.D.
Director of Career Development

LLW/rlk
Attachment



DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
FACULTY OF EDUCATION
THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

January 16, 1981

Dear APEEGA member:

At present I am doing a thesis that involves sampling the opinions of various individuals and groups on how they arrive at moral decisions and their experience surrounding failures in moral judgment. The rationale for this study is based on the assumption that individuals and groups approach ethical decision-making differently. The question being asked is two-fold: Is there a difference and why? For example, does the politician or business man differ in his approach to moral judgments from the social scientist? If so, why?

I am grateful to your association for its support of this research. Your name has been randomly selected from among the membership. With this cover letter I want to ask you for your participation in this project. I would appreciate your giving this your favorable attention.

Enclosed you will find a letter from Dr. Williams, the director of career development, indicating the association's support of this endeavor. Also, you will find two questionnaires which I would ask you to fill out and return in the self-addressed envelope by February 27, 1981. Please be assured that:

1. all replies are strictly confidential,
2. this research is for thesis work only,
3. your name is being used for mailing purposes only, and
4. that results of this project will be made available and summarized in your professional newsletter.

I want to express my appreciation for your cooperation and assistance.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Ray Bouzief".

Ray Bouzief
Ph.D. Candidate




APPENDIX 6

A FRIENDLY REMINDER

Dear APEEGA Member:

This card is being sent to remind you about the questionnaire on moral decision-making which was sent to you recently. If you have already mailed in the questionnaire, thank you. If not, would you consider taking time to complete it soon. Your participation is needed to make results significant. Thanks.

Yours,

Ray Douziech

APPENDIX 7

Mosher Forced-Choice Inventory
(used with permission of the author)

This questionnaire consists of a number of pairs of statements or opinions which have been given by college men in response to the "Mosher Incomplete Sentences Test." These men were asked to complete phrases such as "When I tell a lie. . ." and "To kill in war. . ." to make a sentence which expressed their real feelings about the stem. This questionnaire consists of the stems to which they responded and a pair of their responses which are lettered A and B.

You are to read the stem and the pair of completions and decide which you most agree with or which is most characteristic of you. Your choice, in each instance, should be in terms of what you believe, how you feel, or how you would react, and not in terms of how you think you should believe, feel, or respond. This is not a test. There are no right or wrong answers. Your choices should be a description of your own personal beliefs, feelings, or reactions.

In some instances you may discover that you believe both completions or neither completion to be characteristic of you. In such cases select the one you more strongly believe to be the case as far as you are concerned. Be sure to find an answer for every choice. Do not omit an item even though it is very difficult for you to decide, just select the more characteristic member of the pair. Encircle the letter, A or B, which you most agree with.

1.

1. When I tell a lie . . .
 - A. it hurts.
 - B. I make it a good one.
2. To kill in war. . .
 - A. is a job to be done.
 - B. is a shame but sometimes a necessity.
3. Women who curse. . .
 - A. are normal.
 - B. make me sick.
4. When anger builds inside me. . .
 - A. I usually explode.
 - B. I keep my mouth shut.
5. If I killed someone in self-defense, I. . .
 - A. would feel no anguish.
 - B. think it would trouble me the rest of my life.
6. I punish myself. . .
 - A. for the evil I do.
 - B. very seldom for other people do it for me.
7. If in the future I committed adultery. . .
 - A. I won't feel bad about it.
 - B. it would be sinful.
8. Obscene literature. . .
 - A. is a sinful and corrupt business.
 - B. is fascinating reading.
9. "Dirty" jokes in mixed company. . .
 - A. are common in our town.
 - B. should be avoided.
10. As a child, sex play. . .
 - A. never entered my mind.
 - B. is quite wide spread.
11. I detest myself for. . .
 - A. my sins and failures.
 - B. for not having more exciting sexual experiences.
12. Sex relations before marriage.
 - A. ruin many a happy couple.
 - B. are good in my opinion.
13. If in the future I committed adultery. . .
 - A. I wouldn't tell anyone.
 - B. I would probably feel bad about it.
14. When I have sexual desires. . .
 - A. I usually try to curb them.
 - B. I generally satisfy them.

15. If I killed someone in self-defense, I. . .
 - A. wouldn't enjoy it.
 - B. I'd be glad to be alive.
16. Unusual sex practices. . .
 - A. might be interesting.
 - B. don't interest me.
17. If I felt like murdering someone. . .
 - A. I would be ashamed of myself.
 - B. I would try to commit the perfect crime.
18. If I hated my parents. . .
 - A. I would hate myself.
 - B. I would rebel at their every wish.
19. After an outburst of anger. . .
 - A. I usually feel quite a bit better.
 - B. I am sorry and say so.
20. I punish myself. . .
 - A. never.
 - B. by feeling nervous and depressed.
21. Prostitution. . .
 - A. is a must.
 - B. breeds only evil.
22. If I killed someone in self-defense, I. . .
 - A. would still be troubled by my conscience.
 - B. would consider myself lucky.
23. When I tell a lie. . .
 - A. I'm angry with myself.
 - B. I mix it with truth and serve it like a Martini.
24. As a child, sex play. . .
 - A. is not good for mental and emotional well being.
 - B. is natural and innocent.
25. When someone swears at me. . .
 - A. I swear back.
 - B. it usually bothers me even if I don't show it.
26. When I was younger, fighting. . .
 - A. was always a thrill.
 - B. disgusted me.

27. As a child, sex play. . .
 - A. was a big taboo and I was deathly afraid of it.
 - B. was common without guilt feelings.
28. After an argument. . .
 - A. I feel mean.
 - B. I am sorry for my actions.
29. "Dirty" jokes in mixed company. . .
 - A. are not proper.
 - B. are exciting and amusing.
30. Unusual sex practices. . .
 - A. are awful and unthinkable.
 - B. are not so unusual to me.
31. When I have sex dreams. . .
 - A. I cannot remember them in the morning.
 - B. I wake up happy.
32. When I was younger, fighting. . .
 - A. never appealed to me.
 - B. was fun and frequent.
33. One should not. . .
 - A. knowingly sin.
 - B. try to follow absolutes.
34. To kill in war. . .
 - A. is good and meritable.
 - B. would be sickening to me.
35. I detest myself for . . .
 - A. nothing, I love life.
 - B. not being more nearly perfect.
36. "Dirty" jokes in mixed company. . .
 - A. are lots of fun.
 - B. are coarse to say the least.
37. Petting. . .
 - A. is something that should be controlled.
 - B. is a form of education.
38. After an argument. . .
 - A. I usually feel better.
 - B. I am disgusted that I allowed myself to become involved.
39. Obscene literature. . .
 - A. should be freely published.
 - B. helps people become sexual perverts.
40. I regret. . .
 - A. my sexual experiences.
 - B. nothing I've ever done.

41. A guilty conscience. . .
 - A. does not bother me too much.
 - B. is worse than a sickness to me.
42. If I felt like murdering someone. . .
 - A. it would be for good reason.
 - B. I'd think I was crazy.
43. Arguments leave me feeling. . .
 - A. That it was a waste of time.
 - B. smarter.
44. After a childhood fight, I felt. . .
 - A. miserable and made up afterwards.
 - B. like a hero.
45. When anger builds inside me. . .
 - A. I do my best to suppress it.
 - B. I have to blow off some steam.
46. Unusual sex practices. . .
 - A. are O.K. as long as they're heterosexual.
 - B. usually aren't pleasurable because you have preconceived feelings about their being wrong.
47. I regret. . .
 - A. getting caught, but nothing else.
 - B. all of my sins.
48. When I tell a lie. . .
 - A. my conscience bothers me.
 - B. I wonder whether I'll get away with it.
49. Sex relations before marriage. . .
 - A. are practiced too much to be wrong.
 - B. in my opinion, should not be practiced.
50. As a child, sex play. . .
 - A. is dangerous.
 - B. is not harmful but does create sexual pleasure.
51. When caught in the act. . .
 - A. I try to bluff my way out.
 - B. truth is the best policy.
52. As a child sex play. . .
 - A. was indulged in.
 - B. is immature and ridiculous.
53. When I tell a lie. . .
 - A. it is an exception or rather an odd occurrence.
 - B. I tell a lie.
54. If I hated my parents. . .
 - A. I would be wrong, foolish, and feel guilty.
 - B. they would know it that's for sure!

55. If I robbed a bank. . .
A. I would give up I suppose.
B. I probably would get away with it.
56. Arguments leave me feeling. . .
A. proud, they certainly are worthwhile.
B. depressed and disgusted.
57. When I have sexual desires. . .
A. they are quite strong.
B. I attempt to repress them.
58. Sin and failure. . .
A. are two situations we try to avoid.
B. do not depress me for long.
59. Sex relations before marriage. . .
A. help people to adjust.
B. should not be recommended.
60. When anger builds inside me. . .
A. I feel like killing somebody.
B. I get sick.
61. If I robbed a bank. . .
A. I would live like a king.
B. I should get caught.
62. Masturbation. . .
A. is a habit that should be controlled.
B. is very common.
63. After an argument. . .
A. I feel proud in victory and understanding in defeat.
B. I am sorry and see no reason to stay mad.
64. Sin and failure. . .
A. are the works of the Devil.
B. have not bothered me yet.
65. If I committed a homosexual act. . .
A. it would be my business.
B. it would show weakness in me.
66. When anger builds inside me. . .
A. I always express it.
B. I usually take it out on myself.
67. Prostitution. . .
A. is a sign of moral decay in society.
B. is acceptable and needed by some people.
68. Capital punishment. . .
A. should be abolished.
B. is a necessity.

69. Sex relations before marriage. . .
A. are O.K. if both parties agree.
B. are dangerous.
70. I tried to make amends. . .
A. for all my misdeeds, but I can't forget them.
B. but not if I could help it.
71. After a childhood fight, I felt. . .
A. sorry.
B. mad and irritable.
72. I detest myself for . . .
A. nothing, and only rarely dislike myself.
B. thoughts I sometimes have.
73. Arguments leave me feeling. . .
A. satisfied usually.
B. exhausted.
74. Masturbation. . .
A. is all right.
B. should not be practiced.
75. After an argument. . .
A. I usually feel good if I won.
B. it is best to apologize to clear the air.
76. I hate. . .
A. sin.
B. moralists and "do gooders."
77. Sex
A. is a beautiful gift of God not to be cheapened.
B. is good and enjoyable.
78. Capital punishment. . .
A. is not used often enough.
B. is legal murder, it is inhuman.
79. Prostitution. . .
A. should be legalized
B. cannot really afford enjoyment.

B30324